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Case No. 20091086-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff / Appellee, 
vs. 
Samuel Marlin King, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for aggravated kidnapping (domestic 
violence), a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (West 
Supp. 2010) and § 77-36-1 (West Supp. 2008), and aggravated assault (domestic 
violence), a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (West 
2004) and § 77-36-1. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)0 (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Defendant presents three claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and seeks 
reversal of his convictions or, alternatively, reconsideration of his failed remand 
motion under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The first two claims 
were included in his original remand motion. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1. A. Should this Court strike Defendant's first two claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel where they rest on non-record evidence attached to his briefs 
addendum? 
l.B. Should this Court reconsider and deny Defendant's unsuccessful rule 
23B motion where he includes no new allegations of nonrecord facts which would 
warrant a remand? 
Standard of Review. No standard of review applies to these issues. 
2. Was Defendant's trial counsel constitutionally ineffective for not objecting 
to admission of a witness's prior inconsistent out-of-court statements to police and 
her subsequent allegedly coerced statements to police? 
Standard of Review. Defendant's claims are raised for the first time on appeal 
and, hence, present a question of law. See State v. Ott, 2010 UT1, \ 16, P.3d , 
cert denied, 131 S. Ct 1472 (2011). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Rule 801, Utah Rules of 
Evidence, are attached in Addendum A. 
2 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged Defendant with aggravated kidnapping, a first degree 
felony, and aggravated assault, a third degree felony. R. 1A-1B, 
Defendant moved for access to the victim's records from Valley Mental 
Health. R. 30-31. He later filed an amended motion seeking the victim's mental 
health records from the Storefront and Safe Haven programs as well as records 
involving her medications. R. 33-34. After the State objected, Defendant submitted 
another motion seeking an order compelling Valley Mental Health to produce 
records concerning the victim's diagnosis and treatment with regard to probation 
for a May 2007 assault conviction. R. 43-47, 50-51. The motion also sought 
information about medication prescribed for the victim by a specific podiatrist and 
bank records from the victim's bank. R. 50-51. The motion alleged that the 
requested information was relevant to the defense because "it relates to [the 
victim's] credibility [.]" Id. The State objected to this additional motion, arguing that 
the records were privileged and they did not contain exculpatory evidence favorable 
to Defendant. R. 54-60. The court sought additional briefing and scheduled oral 
argument. R. 64-66; R. 148:4-8. 
Three weeks later, Defendant filed a motion asking the court to strike oral 
argument and set the case for a pre-trial conference. R. 67-68. Defense counsel 
"3" 
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explained that his additional research into the governing statutory and case law 
revealed that the defense would be "unable to meet the admissibility requirements 
regarding the alleged victims [sic] medical and bank recordsf.]" R. 67; R. 149:3. The 
judge executed the proposed order submitted by defense counsel, and the matter 
proceeded to trial. R. 69, 70-95. 
Following a two-day trial, the jury convicted Defendant as charged. R. 96-98. 
The judge ordered a presentence investigation report to ensure he did not miss any 
mitigating factors that might bear on the mandatory sentencing requirements for the 
aggravating kidnapping conviction. R. 152:192-93. Ultimately, the judge could not 
find an appropriate mitigating factor to warrant a downward departure. R. 153:12-
13. Consequently, he sentenced Defendant to concurrent indeterminate prison 
terms of fifteen years to life for aggravated kidnapping and zero to five years for 
aggravated assault; he ran the terms consecutive to the commitment Defendant was 
already serving at the time. R. 153:13. 
Defendant timely appealed, and the Utah Supreme Court poured the matter 
over to this Court. R. 126-28,133-36,145. 
Before filing his opening brief, Defendant filed a motion under rule 23B, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, seeking a remand to explore his claims of ineffective 
assistance of his trial counsel. The motion claimed that Defendant's "trial counsel 
4 
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was ineffective in failing to obtain an expert witness and failing to discover medical 
records." See Order Denying Remand (attached in Addendum B). Defendant 
submitted with his motion two affidavits purporting to allege "facts not fully 
appearing in the record on appeal" and to demonstrate the claimed ineffectiveness. 
See Utah R. App. P. 23B(b). In denying the motion, this Court held that it was 
"properly supported with affidavits and otherwise well-presented," but that it failed 
to meet the prejudice requirement for a remand because the information sought by 
the motion amounted to "cumulative impeachment evidence regarding the victim's 
general credibility," which was "not likely to have resulted in a different outcome" 
in light of the remaining evidence supporting the victim's testimony. See Order 
Denying Remand. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Players: 
Pam Westphal has been homeless for much of her adult life and has struggled 
with mental and drug-related problems. R. 152:4-6. She was diagnosed with 
depression and meth-induced psychosis as well as post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD), the last of which arose after Pam was the victim of a robbery while working 
at a convenience store. R. 152:5-7. As a result, Pam has been taking Zoloft for 
several years to help with depression and Trazodone to help with sleep. R. 152:5-6. 
5 
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In September of 2008, Pam received a lump-sum disability payment of $26,000 
from the social security administration. R. 152:7-8,10. She immediately deposited 
the money in a bank account in her name. R. 152:11. Over the course of several 
weeks, she spent some of the money on drugs and alcohol. R. 152:49,59. She also 
gave a lot of it away. She gave some to her kids, some to a woman who had helped 
her out over the years, and some to "a lot" of homeless people she ran into. R. 
152:10-11,61. Among the latter was a homeless "pregnant girl" at the park that Pam 
"gave money to almost every other day." R. 152:61. 
Pam also gave money to Defendant. R. 152:9. Pam and Defendant were alike 
in many ways. Both were homeless at various times, both drank, both smoked crack 
cocaine, and both spent their days at Pioneer Park in Salt Lake City or around the 
homeless shelters. R. 125:6; R. 151:93-94,112; R. 152:4,13-15,45,49, 52-53,130; R. 
153:3. Pam first met Defendant in 2007 at the homeless shelter near Pioneer Park. R. 
152:4-5. Pam had been homeless for about six months at the time. R. 152:5. The two 
became romantically involved and moved in together in early 2008. Id. It was only 
after Pam received the lump-sum payment in September, however, that the violence 
began. R. 152:12. Defendant started asking Pam to buy him things and began 
"harping on her" about it. R. 152:9-10. He wanted her to put the money into his 
bank account, and he got mad when she gave the money to other people. R. 
6 
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151:195; R. 152:11,136. Pam spent about $2,000 on Defendant, and ultimately gave 
him $5,000, hoping that would satisfy him. R. 152:9,11-12. It did not. Instead, 
Defendant became increasingly angry and 'Very violent" with Pam. R. 151:196; R. 
152:12. He began "hitting" her, and at one point, picked her up by the throat and 
started to strangle her. R. 152:12. Diana Miller, a longtime friend of Pam's, saw 
some of the "bruises" that Pam suffered during the time of the abuse. R. 151:202. 
Defendant's violence after he received the $5,000 prompted Pam to move out, 
even though she had nowhere to go and had to leave some of her things behind. R. 
152:11-14. When she was able to return for some of them, she had her friend Diana 
accompany her to Defendant's apartment because she was "frightened of him[.]" R, 
151:192; R. 152:12. 
Like Pam and the Defendant, Jackie Juarez drank, did drugs, and hung out at 
Pioneer Park. R. 151:92-93,172. Jackie had known Defendant for more than ten 
years, believed him to be "a very intelligent man[,]"described him as her 
"brother[,]" and called herself his sister or his buddy. R. 151:88, 94, 100, 135. 
Despite this close relationship, she claimed she had not been to Defendant's 
apartment before September 25, 2008, and did not know before that time that 
Defendant and Pam had lived together. R. 151:102-03,118,131. Jackie had not 
7 
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known Pam long and did not like her. R. 151:100-01,129-30,132. But she knew 
about Pam's money. R. 151:102. 
The Kidnapping and Assault: 
On September 25, 2008, Pam spent much of the day at Pioneer Park, as had 
Defendant. R. 151:126-28; R. 152:14-15. Defendant spent the day drinking Vodka 
with Jackie and his friends at the park. R. 151:93; R. 152:23. During the day, Pam 
smoked crack cocaine and drank a little vodka, sharing a pint with several other 
people. R. 152:15,38. Jackie did the same. R. 151:93. After it got dark, Pam was 
looking for her boyfriend when Jackie approached her from behind and wrapped an 
electrical cord around her throat. R. 152:16. As Jackie held the cord in place, Pam 
heard Defendant telling Jackie what to do. R. 152:16. 
Defendant and Jackie walked Pam to a nearby picnic table, securing her to the 
table with the cord. R. 152:18-19. Defendant was angry with Pam, complaining that 
she had been "disrespecting him" and repeatedly telling her that he was going to 
kill her. R. 152:18, 22, 25. Defendant called a cab and, as they waited, hit Pam 
several times in the back of the head. R. 152:21-22. When another of his friends, 
Alaska, tried to hit Pam, Jackie stood in front of Pam to prevent it. R. 152:22. As the 
cab arrived, Jackie told Pam not to say anything to the driver, and Defendant 
threatened to kill her if she did. R. 152:23. 
8 
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The cab dropped Defendant, Pam, and Jackie at Defendant's apartment where 
Defendant continued to threaten to kill Pam. R. 152:27-28, 33-34. At one point, 
Defendant threatened to burn Pam with a cigarette. R. 151:117. At another, he 
threatened to cut out her tongue, going so far as to heat the blade of a knife on the 
kitchen stove. R. 152:32-33. The resulting smoke set off the smoke alarm. Id. 
Defendant set aside the knife to deal with the alarm and never acted on the threat. 
R. 152:33. 
Throughout the evening, Defendant repeatedly told Pam that they would take 
her to the bank the next morning so that she could withdraw the rest of her money 
and give it to him. R. 152:28-29,33-34. Eventually, Defendant handed Jackie a roll 
of black duct tape and told her to tie Pam up with it because "that bitch likes to run" 
and "might wander off in the night. R. 151:118; R. 152:30. Jackie used the tape to 
bind Pam's wrists snugly together behind her back and to put her ankles together. 
R. 152:30-31. Defendant and Jackie continued to drink Vodka for three to four 
hours, during which time Defendant tried to force Pam to drink. R. 152:32,34-35. 
Defendant finally went to his bedroom and fell asleep. R. 152:34-35. Jackie fell 
asleep on a futon in the living room, leaving Pam on the floor. R. 151:114,150-51; R. 
152:34-35. 
9 
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Throughout the ordeal, Pam believed that Defendant might follow through 
on his death threats. R. 152:26. She was "scared to death" and unable to sleep, so 
that she worked with the duct tape binding her. R. 152:35. Eventually, she found a 
loose end and released her hands. R. 152:36. She then unbound her feet and left 
through the front door. R. 152:36. She could not run due to an old injury, but 
walked as fast as she could to a Maverik convenience store three to five blocks away 
and dialed 911. R. 151:75; R. 152:36. 
The Investigation: 
When Officer Folau of the Salt Lake City Police Department arrived at the 
Maverick on North Temple in response to Pam's 4:30 a.m. call, he found a 
distraught Pam with black duct tape wrapped tightly around each of her wrists and 
ankles. R. 151:59. He spoke briefly with her, then went to Defendant's apartment. 
R. 151:62. Finding the door wide open and seeing Jackie asleep in the living room, 
he pounded on the door and announced himself. R. 151:63-64, 75. Jackie woke up 
and invited him in. R. 151:64, 75. As he entered, he saw a roll of black duct tape in 
plain view by the sofa where Jackie had been sleeping. R. 151:64. He found 
Defendant asleep in his bedroom with the door open and—in plain view—a number 
of knives, including a knife with a white handle matching the description given by 
10 
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Pam. R. 151:66-69. He also found "many, many, many cords" in the apartment. R. 
151:70,143. 
Detective Hillary Gordon, who worked with the domestic violence unit of the 
Salt Lake City Police Department, interviewed the relevant players. R. 152:110-13. 
She interviewed Pam the morning of September 26 and again about a week later. At 
this first interview, the detective did not know what had happened and had talked 
to no one else about the incident. R. 152:113-14. She found Pam to be "very volatile 
emotionally" and "kind of shell shocked[.]" R. 152:114. Pam was visibly upset and 
wanted the duct tape removed quickly. R. 152:114-16. As the crime lab worker 
removed it, Pam quipped, "that girl's fingerprints are on here [the tape], and I want 
her to pay[.]"l R. 152:151-52. Throughout the first interview, Pam would cry, talk 
and respond to questions, and periodically exclaim something like, "Oh, my gosh, 
I'm going to be in trouble[.]" R. 152:114. Although distraught, Pam was able to 
communicate "fairly decent[ly,]" track the conversation, and answer questions 
appropriately. R. 152:122-24,151. When she went off on a tangent, the detective 
was able to direct her back to the discussion easily. R. 152:151. 
1
 Although the crime lab obtained prints from the tape, none were sufficient to 
permit any comparison. R. 151:120-21. 
11 
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Because Pam was "absolutely terrified of going back" to the shelter and had 
no where else to go, victim advocates tried, without success, to find a place for her. 
R. 152:122-23. Unwilling to put her back on the streets immediately, they chose to 
put her in a detoxification unit that had an empty bed. R. 152:123. 
About a week later, Pam sought out Detective Gordon to find out the status of 
the case and whether Defendant and Jackie had been released. R. 152:123. Pam was 
afraid the two might get out of jail and come to kill her. R. 152:123. By then, the 
detective had received and reviewed Officer Folau's report and wanted to clarify a 
couple of things with Pam. R. 152:123,142. Pam had originally said that a black 
cord had been wrapped around her neck, but Officer Folau retrieved a white cord 
from the scene. R. 152:123-24,142. Pam insisted it was black and maintained as 
much when asked again by Detective Gordon. R. 152:123-24,142. Additionally, 
Pam originally reported to the detective that Defendant held a knife to her side 
during the cab ride but when asked again, she said that Defendant did not use a 
knife in the cab. R. 152:124,140-41. 
Detective Gordon also interviewed Defendant and Jackie the morning they 
were arrested. R. 152:124-25. Defendant refused to answer any questions about the 
knife. R. 152:131. He admitted to smoking crack the day of the incident, but made 
12 
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no other admissions and claimed that Pam "was crazy" and must have duct taped 
herself. R. 152:131,149. 
The detective found Jackie in handcuffs because she had been "mouthy" to 
the officers watching her and they opted not to take them off. R. 152:125. The 
detective removed the cuffs, hoping it would help with the interview. R. 152:125-26. 
She found Jackie to be "very difficult" to talk to because she was a talker who talked 
in circles, would not give straight answers, and took things back. R. 152:125-26. 
Jackie said that Defendant invited Pam to the apartment to get the rest of her 
things and that Pam went only after Jackie assured her that she would go with her. 
R. 152:127-28. Jackie confirmed that Defendant and Alaska tried to hit Pam at the 
park, but claimed that she stopped them because she could not stand to watch a 
woman beat down. R. 152:128. She also confirmed that Defendant "was f-ing with 
that bitch [referring to Pam], and he was scaring her." R. 152:129. When asked who 
taped Pam, Jackie did not answer directly, but said that Defendant told her that Pam 
liked to roam in the middle of the night. R. 152:129-30. Like Defendant, Jackie also 
refused to answer any questions about the knife. R. 152:130. 
The detective interviewed Jackie a second time because she thought that 
Jackie was more of a talker than Defendant. R. 152:131-32. She spoke with Jackie at 
the county jail, taking the approach of "bluffing her quite a bit. . . trying to see if 
13 
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[Jackie] was going to give . . . any more information, or if she was just going to 
continue to talk in circles." R. 152:131-32. No charges had yet been filed, so the two 
discussed possible charges, and the detective stated that the district attorney's office 
would give Jackie a deal, despite the fact that the officer had no authority to offer a 
deal. R. 152:133-34. The detective also told Jackie that Defendant "had rolled on" 
her when he had not. R. 152:133. This ultimately prompted Jackie to comment, "I 
thought we were going to ride this out together. We talked about this. We were 
going to ride it out together." R. 152:156. 
During the second interview, Jackie admitted that at the time of the incident, 
she knew about Pam's money, knew that Defendant wanted it, knew that Defendant 
"was enraged" at Pam because she was giving money away to other people and was 
sleeping with someone else. R. 152:134-36. Jackie believed that without her 
presence, Defendant might have killed Pam. Id. Jackie still did not admit to taping 
Pam's arms and legs, but when Detective Gordon lied and said that Defendant's 
prints were found on the tape taken off Pam, Jackie asked, "Well, what if my 
fingerprints come back on that tape?" R. 152:136-37. She repeatedly noted that she 
"should have stayed out of it. " R. 152:155. 
14 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
After filing an unsuccessful motion for a remand under rule 23B, Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, Defendant now argues that his trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance in several ways. First, he presents the same issues he raised in 
his rule 23B motion: his counsel's alleged failure to properly investigate Pam's 
mental state and the need for a mental health expert and to properly request 
discovery of Pam's mental health files. Then he presents a new claim of ineffective 
assistance: his counsel's failure to object to the admission of Jackie's statements 
given at two pre-trial police interviews. Additionally, he seeks reversal of his 
convictions or, alternatively, a remand for an evidentiary hearing under rule 23B. 
Merits review of Defendant's two mental health claims is not warranted, and 
this Court should strike not only the non-record affidavits attached to his brief, but 
also the arguments, which rely heavily on the affidavits. The very absence of a 
record-based argument demonstrates that the appellate record does not support 
these two claims of error. 
Defendant's request for reconsideration of the rule 23B motion should be 
denied because he provides no new nonspeculative allegation of nonrecord facts 
upon which to base a reconsideration. The requirement is not met by mere citation 
to additional publications and authorities. Neither is it met by Defendant's new 
15 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ineffective assistance claim challenging counsel's failure to object to the admission 
of evidence. The new claim may be reviewed on the appellate record before this 
Court and decided without regard to the merits of Defendant's mental health 
claims. 
Finally, Defendant's trial counsel did not perform objectively unreasonably by 
not objecting to the admission of Jackie's statements made in the two pre-trial police 
interviews. First, the statements from the first interview were inconsistent with the 
witness' trial testimony, thereby permitting their use under rule 801(d)(1)(A), Utah 
Rules of Evidence. Thus, an objection raised by Defendant's trial counsel would 
have been futile. 
Second, defense counsel actively used the detective's interview tactics and the 
witness' statements from the second interview to undermine the integrity of the 
State's evidence and the reliability of the police investigation. Consequently, the 
lack of an objection to the evidence was a matter of reasonable trial strategy. In any 
event, even absent the evidence from the second interview, the remaining evidence, 
including Jackie's prior inconsistent statements from the first interview, provide 
ample support for the jury's decision, defeating Defendant's claim. 
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ARGUMENTS 
I. 
DEFENDANTS CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
RELATING TO THE VICTIM'S MENTAL STATE AND MENTAL 
HEALTH FILES ARE NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT 
AND SHOULD BE STRICKEN; EVEN IF THE ARGUMENTS 
ARE VIEWED AS A RENEWED RULE 23B MOTION, THEY 
SHOULD BE DENIED 
Defendant claims that his trial counsel performed deficiently by: 
(1) not properly investigating the victim's mental state before trial and 
not using an expert witness to educate the jury as to her mental state; 
(2) not making a proper request for discovery of Pam's mental health 
files; and 
(3) not objecting to testimony from Detective Gordon concerning out-
of-court statements made by Jackie Juarez during her two police 
interviews. 
Aplt. Br. at 1,13-44. Defendant, however, does not merely seek a review of his 
claims on the merits and a reversal of his conviction. Instead, he asks this Court to 
reconsider his failed Rule 23B motion, urging this Court to "reassess" his ineffective 
assistance claims "in the context of the entire appeal" and asking that he be granted 
a remand to supplement the record with additional evidence. See id. at 6 n.l, 11,50. 
He also asserts that he is attempting to preserve his arguments for presentation to 
the Utah Supreme Court in a petition for writ of certiorari should his appeal fail in 
this Court. See id. 
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Only the first two of Defendant's three ineffective assistance claims were 
asserted in his initial rule 23B motion. His arguments on both those claims, together 
with the two supporting affidavits attached to his brief, should be stricken because 
the affidavits are not part of the appellate record, and the arguments are wholly 
dependent on the affidavits. 
Should this Court reconsider Defendant's rule 23B motion in light of the 
arguments in his brief, it should affirm its earlier denial of the motion where the 
additional allegations advanced by Defendant do not warrant a different outcome. 
Finally, the lack of an objection to the admission of Jackie's pre-trial interview 
statements does not amount to deficient performance where the statements from the 
first interview were properly admitted, thereby rendering any objection futile, and 
where the statements from the second interview were used by defense counsel in 
furtherance of a reasonable trial strategy. 
A. To the Extent that Defendant's First Two Claims of Ineffective 
Assistance Present Substantive Arguments, They Should be 
Stricken 
Defendant's first two arguments involve allegations of ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel for (1) not adequately investigating and developing expert testimony 
on Pam's mental state and (2) not making a proper request for Pam's mental health 
files. See Aplt. Br. at 14-32. Defendant includes these arguments to permit this 
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Court to "reassess" his earlier request for a rule 23B remand. See id. at 6, n.l. 
However, he also seeks a ruling on the merits of his ineffective assistance claims: he 
states the issues in terms of standard substantive ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims and references only the legal standard for such claims and not the 
requirements for consideration of a rule 23B motion. See id. at 2, 6-7 n.l, 11-14. 
To the extent that this Court views Defendant's arguments as advancing 
substantive claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, it should strike these first 
two claims and their supporting affidavits because the arguments rely almost 
exclusively on the affidavits, which are non-record evidence. 
Defendant asserted the first two of his three claims of ineffective assistance in 
his unsuccessful rule 23B motion. See Memorandum in Support of 23B Motion to 
Remand ["Memo"] (attached in Addendum C); Order Denying Remand. In 
keeping with rule 23B, he submitted with his motion two affidavits purporting to 
allege "facts not fully appearing in the record on appeal" and to demonstrate the 
2
 Defendant claims that rule 23B "does not preclude" renewal of a rule 23B 
motion in the opening brief on appeal. See Aplt. Br. at 6, n.l. However, neither does 
it permit presentation of a rule 23B motion within the opening brief. 
Rather, the rule provides that a remand motion "shall be filed prior to the 
filing of the appellant's brief" or, "[u]pon a showing of good cause, . . . after the 
filing of the appellant's brief." Utah R. App. P. 23B(a). However, the rule goes on 
to provide that this Court may remand under the rule "on its own motion at any 
time" if the claim was raised and the motion would have been available. Id. 
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claimed ineffectiveness. See Utah R. App. P. 23B(b). This Court held that although 
the motion was "properly supported with affidavits and otherwise well-presented/' 
it failed to meet the prejudice requirement for a remand: 
[t]he additional proposed testimony and records are cumulative 
impeachment evidence regarding the victim's general credibility. Such 
additional evidence is not likely to have resulted in a different 
outcome. The victim's testimony was supported by other testimony,, 
and it is the jury's province to determine credibility and the weight to 
give a witness's testimony. 
See Order Denying Remand. 
Defendant's opening brief presents the same two issues and includes in the 
addendum the same two non-record affidavits originally submitted in support of 
the remand motion. See Aplt. Br. at 14-32 & Add. C & E. His arguments as to these 
claims rely on and pervasively cite to the affidavits. See id. Use of the nonrecord 
information is not relegated to footnotes or to a separate, severable paragraph. In 
fact, Defendant fails to present any argument as to these two claims that is based 
solely on the appellate record before this Court. In essence, he concedes by this 
omission that the appellate record does not support either of his substantive claims. 
It is well-settled that affidavits submitted in support of a motion to remand 
cannot be used as substantive evidence to support an appellate claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. See State v. Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285, 290 (Utah App. 1998) 
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(refusing to allow Bredehoft to rely upon "unsubstantiated allegations [from a rule 
23B affidavit] on appeal as proof of ineffective assistance of counsel" and striking 
the affidavit and all references to it in Bredehoft's brief); see also Low v. Bonacci, 788 
P.2d 512, 513 (Utah 1990) (appellate courts "do not consider new evidence on 
appeal"). Accordingly, both affidavits and all references thereto in Defendant's 
opening brief must be stricken. See Bredehoft, 966 P.2d at 290. Given Defendant's 
pervasive reliance on these affidavits in his first two arguments, there would remain 
no claim of substantive error for this Court to review. 
B. This Court Should Refuse to Reconsider the Renewed Rule 23B 
Motion 
Defendant expressly seeks reconsideration of his rule 23B motion, asking this 
Court to "reassess" his claims "in the context of the entire appeal." Aplt. Br. at 6, 
n.l. This Court should refuse the request because Defendant's arguments do not 
justify reconsideration of his motion. 
A remand is available under rule 23B " only upon a nonspeculative allegation 
of facts, not fully appearing in the record on appeal, which, if true, could support a 
determination that counsel was ineffective." Utah R. App. P. 23B(a). To obtain 
reconsideration of a rule 23B motion, Defendant must present some new 
"'nonspeculative allegation of facts'" meeting the specifications of the rule. See State 
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v. Chavez-Espinoza, 2008 UT App 191, f 26,186 P.3d 1023 (refusing to reconsider the 
denial of earlier rule 23B motion absent presentation of new "'nonspeculative 
allegation of facts'") (quoting Utah R. App. P. 23B(a)), cert denied, 199 P.3d 367 (Utah 
2008). 
Here, reconsideration is not appropriate because Defendant presents no new 
nonspeculative allegation of facts in support of his reconsideration request. His 
argument concerning defense counsel's request for Pam's mental health records 
includes no new factual allegations beyond that contained in the original rule 23B 
remand motion. Compare Aplt. Br. at 25-32 with Memo at 32-41. Defendant merely 
restates the same argument already addressed by this Court. Id. 
Defendant's complaint that his trial counsel failed to investigate Pam's mental 
state and to call a mental health expert includes additional citations, but no new 
nonspeculative allegation of facts. The brief repeats the allegation from the original 
motion that research demonstrates that someone with a history of drug use "likely 
has significantly impaired cognitive processes." Aplt. Br. at 15-18 (holding and 
initial capitalization removed); Memo at 18-22. It then reiterates the same 
supporting argument with the addition of citations to various articles, treatises, and 
reports detailing the adverse effects of methamphetamine use. See Aplt. Br. at 16-18. 
Defendant's earlier motion included the same essential argument supported instead 
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by the affidavit of Defendant's proposed expert. Compare Aplt. Br. at 15-18 (citing 
articles, treatises and reports) with Memo at 18-20 (relying on the expert affidavit 
filed in support of the motion). The remainder of the argument in both the brief and 
the memorandum involves the proposed expert's ability to assist the jury in 
evaluating Pam's testimony. Compare Aplt. Br. at 20-24 with Memo at 25-31. In 
other words, Defendant presents the same basic argument to this Court, albeit with 
citations to different authority, without reference to any additional "nonspeculative 
allegation of facts." Hence, reconsideration is not warranted See Chavez-Espinoza, 
2008 UT App 191, f 26. 
Similarly, Defendant's third ineffective assistance claim lacks the 
nonspeculative allegations of facts necessary for reconsideration. Defendant claims 
that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not objecting to Detective 
Gordon's recitation of Jackie's responses in her two pre-trial police interviews. See 
Aplt. Br. at 32-50. The argument is designed to address this Court's earlier rejection 
of the rule 23B motion based on its assessment that the additional mental health 
evidence sought by Defendant would amount only to "cumulative impeachment 
evidence," which was "not likely to have resulted in a different outcome" given the 
existence of "other testimony" supporting the victim's testimony. Order Denying 
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Remand. The third claim seeks to undermine some of the "other testimony" 
referenced by this Court. Id. 
The claim does not justify reconsideration of the rule 23B motion because it 
fails to present any new "nonspeculative allegation of facts [] not fully appearing in 
the record on appealf.]" Utah R. App. P. 23B(a); see also Chavez-Espinoza, 2008 UT 
App 191,1 26. In fact, the claim has no bearing on whether a remand under rule 
23B is warranted. The claim may be entirely reviewed and decided on the present 
appellate record without the need for a remand. If the record demonstrates the 
claimed ineffectiveness, the conviction will be reversed and the case remanded 
independent of Defendant's mental health-related claims, without the need for a 
rule 23B remand. If the record does not demonstrate ineffectiveness, then the claim 
fails, leaving this Court's prejudice analysis in its previous order unchanged. In 
either case, the new claim is irrelevant to whether a remand under rule 23B is 
appropriate. 
Accordingly, Defendant's arguments fail to provide any basis on which to 
reconsider this Court's ruling on the previous remand motion. This Court should 
3
 As explained in Point II, below, the record does not support the new claim of 
ineffective assistance. 
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thus refuse Defendant's reconsideration request. See Chavez-Espinoza, 2008 UT App 
191, f 26. 
II. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING 
TO OBJECT TO THE ADMISSION OF A WITNESS'S 
STATEMENTS FROM TWO PRE-TRIAL INTERVIEWS WHERE 
AN OBJECTION TO THE STATEMENTS FROM THE FIRST 
INTERVIEW WOULD HAVE BEEN FUTILE, AND WHERE 
COUNSEL HAD A STRATEGIC REASON FOR ADMITTING 
THE STATEMENTS FROM THE SECOND INTERVIEW 
Defendant contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for 
not objecting to the admission of testimony from Detective Gordon concerning 
Jackie Juarez's statements made during two police interviews. See Aplt. Br. at 32-50. 
Defendant argues that the statements from the first interview were inadmissible 
under rule 801(d)(1)(A), Utah Rules of Evidence, because they were not inconsistent 
with Jackie's in-court testimony. See id. at 37-39. He contends that the statements 
from the second interview were inadmissible because of Detective Gordon's 
coercive interview techniques. See id. at 39-43. Defendant claims that his trial 
counsel's failure to object to this testimony amounted to deficient performance, and 
that the admission of the evidence resulted in prejudice. See id. at 43-50. 
Contrary to his arguments, the statements from the first interview were in fact 
admissible under rule 801(d)(1)(A) as inconsistent out-of-court statements, thereby 
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rendering any objection to their admission futile. Counsel cannot be deemed 
deficient for failing to raise futile objections. See State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, f 26,1 
P.3d 546. With respect to the statements from the second interview, defense counsel 
had a reasonable strategic reason for admitting those statements. In any event, they 
did not result in prejudice. 
A. The Standard for Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant must show that trial 
counsel's performance was deficient—that is, counsel's performance did not meet 
an objective standard of reasonableness —by identifying the specific acts or 
omissions he alleges did not result from reasonable professional judgment. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687-88,690 (1984). Defendant must also show 
that "'counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial/" in that there is "a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.'" Id. at 687,694. A reasonable probability is 
one that undermines confidence in the outcome. See State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 
187 (Utah 1990). The showing of prejudice must be a "demonstrable reality and not 
a speculative matter." State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998) (quotation 
omitted). Moreover, counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise futile objections. 
See Kelley, 2000 UT 41,1 26; State v. King, 2010 UT App 396, f 31,248 P.3d 984. 
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With respect to the first Strickland prong, an appellate court "must 'indulge in 
the strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the 
presumption that under the circumstances, the challenged action might be 
considered sound trial strategy."' State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539,542 (Utah App. 1998) 
(quotations and citations omitted); State v, Holbert, 2002 UT App 426, f 58, 61 P.3d 
291 (holding no deficient performance where counsel's action may be the result of a 
tactical choice). This standard is appropriately deferential, recognizing the "variety 
of circumstances faced by defense counsel" and "the range of legitimate decisions 
regarding how to best represent a criminal defendant." State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250, 
1254 (Utah 1993). In keeping with this, Defendant must prove that there is no 
conceivable tactical basis for trial counsel's actions. See King, 2010 UT App 396, ^  31. 
Absent such proof, Defendant cannot demonstrate deficient performance. See State 
v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, If 7, 89 P.3d 162; Holbert, 2002 UT App 426, f 58. 
In short, a "defendant is not guaranteed successful assistance of counsel," nor 
is a defendant entitled to relief merely by asserting that his counsel's "performance 
could have been better," or even that it "might have contributed to his conviction." 
Tyler, 850 P.2d at 1258 (quotations and citation omitted). Instead, a defendant's 
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"constitutional right entitles him only to effective assistance of counsel, not to the 
best or most complete representation available/7 Id. 
B. Statements from Jackie's first interview were admissible, 
thereby making an objection futile 
Rule 801(d)(1)(A), Utah Rules of Evidence, provides: 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if: 
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or 
hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement 
and the statement is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or 
the witness denies having made the statement or has forgotten . . . . 
Defendant first argues that the statements Jackie made at her first interview 
with Detective Gordon were inadmissible hearsay under this rule because they were 
not inconsistent with her trial testimony. See Aplt. Br. 37-39. On the contrary, not 
only were the statements inconsistent, but Jackie testified that she did not remember 
making some of them. 
Detective Gordon testified that during the first interview, Jackie made the 
following statements: 
—Defendant wanted Pam to come to the apartment to get the rest of her 
clothes (R. 152:127); 
—Pam was afraid to go to Defendant's apartment (R. 152:128); 
-Defendant was trying to hit Pam while they were at the park (R. 152:128); 
-Defendant "was f-ing with that bitch [Pam], and he was scaring her" while 
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they were at the apartment (R. 1"2-"129V 
See also Aplt. Br. at 37, The detective also tesuiitu v. • 
-when asked UPOUI ine auct tape, jauac ^voidcu tut>w ^ ,;.^ L,,<. 
question of who taped Pam and mere:}7 said that Defendant void r.M; *:Ml 
Pam "lib'vl t,* — n - :- 'h^midd1- ^f^" night" (R l^-'PQ-^O) -* . 
J ackie refused to an si v er when asked about Defendant having a 
i *:t* /D ico. ian\ 
jK, I | I I_C " I . \ . ! \* f( li, MM. 
See also Aplt. Br. at 37. 
Although Defendant claims that all of these statements were consistent with 
Jackie's testimony, see Aplt. Br. at 3/ -39, her testimony, in ~u i. d, • lorea sij;:i^: ^  . / 
on these points: 
—] ackie testified that she did not remember telling Detective Gordon that it 
was Defendant who wanted Pam,,., to go to the apartment to get her clothes (R. 
151:173); that she invited Pam,, to go to the apartment when she discovered 
that Pam had nowhere to sleep that night, but that Defendant "didn't 
want her to go" (R. 151:109-10, 1 1 8,1,33-34,1,38-39; 1,61,164,185);4 that she did 
not know' at that time that Pam had lived at the apartment and still had 
• clothes there (R. 151:133-34); 
—Jackie testined that Pam wanted to go to UIL leni, u u u i - : . 
afraid that Defendant was mad at her (R. 1 rl 1 - - 141. ^  ^ 
—Jackie could not remember if she had to stop Defendant from hitting Pam at 
the park, but testified, that if he had, wanted to hit Pam, Jackie could, not have 
stopped him, (R. 151:107,134-35); later she testified that Defendant did not try 
kie reiterated at least nine times in her testimony at trial uiai
 : teienaant 
d idno twan tPam togo iolheaparimr-f R *~--io- - i ; 1"3-?4, - 1 
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to hit Pam at the park (R. 151:161); 
-Jackie remembered that Defendant and Pam argued at the apartment, but 
testified that Defendant did not threaten Pam (R. 151:115,148); later she 
testified that Defendant threatened to burn Pam with his cigarette (R. 
151:117); 
-Jackie initially denied taping Pam, denied that Defendant taped Pam, and 
claimed she did not remember Pam being taped or Defendant gaving her 
ULlC t u u v ^ V*"*-* Ac /A . A A W , i u J l / j a L i x i C : i u l C i \,\ZO Lii.lv: UL i l i i U v i . tv/ i^'v, i. l " I V v I l U iCi.L/"wl 
Pam because Defendant "was in the back room" (R. 151:119); she then 
testified that she had already admitted taping Pam when the prosecutor first 
asked the question (R. 151:119-20,153); finally, she testified that she did not 
remember taping Pam but "it had to be" her, she was drunk, and she did it 
because Pam would not shut up (R. 151:153-56); and 
-Jackie testified that Defendant had a knife at the apartment, but that he 
merely gave it to Pam to clean her dirty fingernails (R. 151:111,166-67). 
Detective Gordon explained at trial that Jackie was "[v]ery difficult to talk to" 
because she tended to "talkQ in circles[.]" R. 152:126. She explained that Jackie 
"says one thing and then takes it back and then goes around in a different circle and 
just talks in circles over and over." R. 152:126. Jackie's trial testimony amply 
demonstrated this tendency. 
In light of the fact that each of the challenged interview statements are 
inconsistent with testimony given by Jackie at trial, and that Jackie claimed not to 
remember some of the statements, all of the challelnged statements were admissible 
under rule 801(d)(1)(A). Because an objection based on the rule would have been 
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futile, trial counsel did not perform deficiently for not objecting. Defendant's claim 
of ineffective assistance for not objecting to the statem ents from, the first interview, 
therefore, necessarily iaub. -^ i.cmy . *,: If 26 ( Fai lure to :i 'ai; •  * f il He 
objections does i lot coi istit ute ii leffecti \ ? e ass i s tance of coi n isel ') ' • . 
i . , II lei'i'inist i minsL'l m a d e Ilk" s t ra teg ic d e c i s i o n t o u s e the 
the State's case 
Final ly ; D e f e n d a n t a rgues n >a L . i^ ;: iu i . * >unsei: v n a u i v d .; »e;:ec;i\ ^ a s s i s t ance 
w. , ^ ~i * - -^v'- *• ^ * J *i"i.^  "i to* tive 
used - ^ v ;rlerview" tactics that rendered Jackie's statements unreliable and 
imolanlary. See id. However, because the record demonstrates thai defense 
counsel had a reasonable strategic decision to use both Jackie's statements and the 
officer's interviewing techniques to undermine the State s case. Defendant has not 
prove*j aeiiciu:.: performance. See Holbei t, 2ilJ()2 [ J I \ p p A 26, i!| [58 (no i neffecti ve 
assistance wliere coti nsel's action m ay be theresi :i It of a legitimate tactical choice). 
Defendant fails to recognize that this Court has long recognized "'a strong 
presumption that counsel acted competently/" State v, Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, f 49, 
55 P.3d 1131 (quoting State r. Qm/dcr. %0 P.2d 351, ^59 (Utah App. 1 - *}\ ™+. 
denied, 6o r.J>^ , .^..oian HM. - ^\\i.-.- . . ^snowmgi/.j i .r.ere was : : J _ :i. j*r> * • .: 
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legitimate tactical basis for counsel's' actions, . . . [this Court] will not find that 
counsel performed ineffectively." Id. (quoting Snyder, 860 P.2d at 359). 
Here, the record demonstrates that defense counsel actively used both the 
interview statements and Detective Gordon's interview techniques to undermine 
the State's case by impeaching the credibility of the testifying officers and 
challenging the quality and effectiveness of the State's investigation. Defense 
counsel laid the foundation for his argument in his cross-examination of both the 
detective and Jackie. He established that the detective believed that she could 
legitimately use any interrogation tactic she wanted short of touching, beating, or 
berating the individual, and that, in this case, she told Jackie "a bunch of lies" 
during the second interview in order to obtain additional information about the 
case. R. 152:132-33,149-50. He also had the detective admit that the techniques do 
not always produce the truth. R. 152:150. Finally, defense counsel was careful to 
establish that Detective Gordon did not speak with Jackie between the second 
interview and the day before trial. Id. 
When he cross-examined Jackie, defense counsel had her admit not only that 
she believed that the detective was lying to her during the second interview, but 
also that she lied to the detective in return. R. 151:126,168. Jackie further testified 
that Detective Gordon specifically wanted her to implicate Defendant and that she 
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ultimately received a deal in which she agreed to testify truthfully at t~;a! 
1 51 ;163, 1 86. Accordingly , she explained ir^i Jicr latemonts JL :riai .; \.t J ,..e 
interview diiierect because at trial, tiniici ikHli, she \ .is idling line iinuillii vliile she 
inlcntiiinally lied during \\\v interview IR lhl;182-83. 
I n his closing ar^timent, defense counsel used that testimony to support his 
argument that the State had failed in its burden of proof. After suggesting that the 
State failed to give the jury necessary physical evidence and that Officer Folau may 
have "manufactured] evidencei.]"' deiensecounsel gave ins interpretation ol the 
evidence from Jackie . - \o:;,i .. u ;\ :>. -. 
W.-iat -^rbjecrrve ^iooi is ti^re that Sam taped her [Jackie] up? 
I Jone. No prints from Sam, in spite of what the cop told Jackie in an , , 
effort to - I guess . this is [the] thinking., "We'll lie to her and she'll 
tell us the truth/' \ crv clover. 1:' vou don't "'trust the police and you 
. know they're lving to vou, you're going to lie right back to them. TlieQ 
[interview statements] are not sworn statements. This is the first time ' 
she's ever come into a court under oath and swore to tell the truth. 
\ Vhy didn't they know what the truth was? They didn't ask her. 
> i'K v ^ L-^ i i:« <ai ihe interv iew] and the) " said, Look, look into - • 
his eyes. Wo want to get Sam. We'll make you a deal, substantially 
reduce these charges. You testify against him." They never found out 
•iv ha t she was going to testify to. I i nterviewed her at the jail right after 
trial, and I knew what she was going to say. She came in here and she' •' 
told you. She told you exactly what she told me months ago. [T]hey 
subpoenaed this witness - and then they have to impeach her because 
tney don't know what she's going to say because they didn't bother to 
v.^terview her to find out "what her truth was. ' • 
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She was given a Class A Misdemeanor off a 1st Degree and a 3rd 
Degree Felony. That's a pretty good deal. She went to jail for a few 
months. But she told me and she told you that she was going to tell the 
truth. They thought that the truth was already told, but they never 
interviewed her again until just yesterday morning, a year later. Didn't 
know what she was going to say. 
They bring in this witness that embarrasses them, and they have 
to impeach her—impeach their own witness because they don't know 
what she's going to say. They don't know what her truth is. They 
didn't do any investigation. They didn't find anything. They didn't 
bring anything to you, and they want you to convict my client on the 
basis of what this woman, who has admitted to lying to a cop, 
admitted that she's got all kinds of problems, that she's all drugged up, 
she's still using, still. 
R. 152:166-67,107-71,173-74.. Still later, he argued: 
. . . [Jackie] admitted what she did, and yeah, she got a good deal 
because the State dropped the ball. They didn't investigate anything. 
They didn't talk to her. They just assumed that, "We're going to get 
Sam, and you're going to help us." She says, "Sure, fine," but they 
never asked her, "Then what are you going to say" until yesterday 
when she surprised them, because she told the truth that they never 
bothered to find out. So they come in here and they have to attack her, 
too, their own witness. 
So she didn't come in here because she's immune to further 
prosecution. She came in here because she felt an obligation to tell you 
the truth. This is the first time she's had the opportunity to do that, 
and that's what she did, and she took responsibility for what she did, 
and she served her time for it. 
In their rush to convict Sam, they said, "We'll make you a deal. 
Great. You're out of here." Then... [yesterday] they come in and say, 
"Oh, by the way, what are you going to say to me?" The State didn't 
want to hear it because they were determined to get Sam, but [Jackie] 
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• told the truth that Sam had nothing to do r\ vith taping her [Pam], 
detaining'her or threatening her 
The conclusion - they jump to conclusions. "Y ou can't do that. • 
You're the jury. You're not cops. You have to have proof to guide you 
and reinforce you and confirm your decision all the way through. 
R. 152:179-80. 
Defense counsel" s closing argument ^emonstrare:: . ^ c . <* i 
< *. L'-yi r\L<" »+ »/ »>"• t "I 1 "' > '^ "* v»"v-» f |,"i - *1 - : -1 t" VI "» | 4 1 i n * • * »-* ' . . > * •, * w * i I 
U L ' j c t L i l I'll L'U .;: t a i c i i L c i i L o J i XJI J i u it, M . * - « , . < i . * i 
sludgy Defense \ linns '1 made the legitimate strategic choice to actively use the 
information to undermine the State's investigation and the reliability and credibility 
of its evidence. As such, the choice represents "a legitimate decision[] regarding 
how best to represent" Defendant and does not demonstrate ineffective assistance. 
Parser* *\ ^arnc-, v ; . ,_ : -• _. . . ' , - ' ••*), ^ t .» i . *...• , 
*•- **•- V * J it demo^iidtes inadequacy of counsel. ) 
^utdtion omitted). I he fact that the strategy did not I:^ve :he expected re<uit or that 
appellate counsel may not agree wiLh it does not establish that trial counsel 
rendered ineffective assistance. :->cc J arsons, k, 1 i\lc .«; ~~4 (quoting State v. Bullock, 
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1991) ("The mere fact that counsel's chosen strategy and tactics did not produce an 
acquittal does not compel the conclusion that counsel was ineffective/'). 
D. Additionally, an objection would have been futile 
where the evidence was not coerced, and counsel 
cannot be ineffective for failing to make a futile 
objection 
In any event, Jackie's statements from the second interview were not coerced, 
thereby rendering any attempt by defense counsel to exclude them on that basis 
futile. Whether a statement or confession is coerced or involuntary requires 
consideration of the totality of the circumstances, including the characteristics of the 
accused and the details of the interrogation. See State v. Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, 
119,984 P.2d 1009; State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930,935-36 (Utah 1998). "[T]he evidence 
must show that the coercive tactics of the police overcame the defendant's free will." 
Gallif 967 P.2d at 936 (citing State v. Mabe, 864 P.2d 890,893 (Utah 1993)). Relevant 
factors include: 
• the duration of the interrogation; 
• the persistence of the officers; 
• police trickery; 
• absence of family and counsel; and 
• threats and promises made by the officers. 
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See State v. Montero, ?~~c : T \vp ^5 | 10,191 P.3d 828. The Court must also 
consider factors such as " „;eu-ndu;ii s mental health, mental deficiency, emot. ; A 
insta bility, eG nation, age, a;.. ; miliaria • • . , -v-- *- . 
in lihisidsC; Defivtn v < Iordonc<indidl\ staled In1?* I v lief that she v ;; HT- ^O 
11 • 11 i 11J i v i d u a 1 s " a n v n umber of things" during an interrogation to get 'them to talk. 
R. 152:132-33. But, in her second interview with Jackie, she misrepresented only 
three things in order to get additional information: 
• that Defendant "had rolled r r 1 
• • llhat Ue-irndant ^ iingerprmivw^ . J , . , on the tape /. . ;• .
 t:. id been 
bound; and 
i her el deal. • • 
^ *M r ^ . " \ 49-50. in other words, the detective attempted to lead Jackie 
10 believe that the State's case against her was stronger than it really was, and that 
she could benefit from telling the detective what really happened among the three 
people present at Deiendar.t s apartment. 
. J'eternldiil has not established lh.il any of these statements overcame lack le's 
*-'-
io *• "^ " i ( : - ^ r v i « .- , ^ • . ••* .' , w t K-y and involved 
only one detective and Jackie. Nothing suggests that Jackie wras denied any physical 
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comfort or convenience, that she was belittled or otherwise disparaged, or that the 
detective played on any obvious physical or psychological weaknesses. 
Moreover, the record reveals no particular vulnerability or shortcoming that 
would make Jackie particularly susceptible to the detective's manipulation. See, e.g., 
Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80,11 2, 6 (eighteen-year-old defendant had below average 
I.Q., maturity level of fifteen-year-old, suffered from attention deficit disorder, 
exhibited symptoms of depression, anxiety disorder, thought disorder, 
schizophrenia, and dependent personality disorder). Defendant claims that 
Detective Gordon exploited Jackie's vulnerabilities simply because Jackie "talks in 
circles, she was homeless and scared, and she had not been implicated in serious 
crime before this case." Aplt. Br. at 41. However, these circumstances are largely 
irrelevant in this case. Jackie's tendency to talk in circles was not exploited by the 
detective's misrepresentations. The detective simply noted that she interviewed 
Jackie because she was more talkative than Defendant, and that when Jackie began 
talking in circles, the detective would "direct [Jackie] back to the actual point" under 
discussion. R. 152:131-32,150-51. 
Neither did either the detective or Jackie recognize that the specifics of the 
interview had any impact on Jackie's homelessness. In fact, it was not established 
that Jackie was homeless. Similarly, there was no testimony suggesting that Jackie's 
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past criminal involvement or lack thereof entered into the interview questions or 
Jackie's responses. . 
i . %^> u u l w j 1 0 "W Ould not obev am K'dv's orders."'7 R. 151:89; R. 
152:172,174. Jackie herself testified that "[n]obody tells [her] what to do" and that 
Defendant, specifically, did not tell her A hat io do. P 151 120. Tackie noted that she 
was only temporanlv lUiicd . \ IHH-A;, e ^e;,KMi ,- -.^  ^  because she was scare.; py 
the prospect of a pi ^ , , \ .. , :. • -- * : • < •. i -in ••••.-J; -\. a *d 
.* ifa:e • • , • - • - /-. < — v\~ ~; -a-t na she 
dr-ridcd to lie right back, thus creating for herself an opportunity to obtain a deal 
while intending to testify that Defendant had no pari in Panrs detention, R. 
151:168-70; R. 152:173-74. While the detective was not authorized to extend a deal to 
Jackie at the time OL iiic second interview, Jackij .;. .ac; received a , :-JIL\ gvod 
deal ii i exchange for vv 1: Latsheled tl: i..e detective to belie\ 'e \ vouldbe her testin i ony 
a a air * npu>n I -•' " ~"-'!7^-"" i • ? -
 c o n fessed efforts to take advantage of the 
opportunity to obtain a benefit for herself by lying to 'the detective demonstrates the 
exercise of free will. 
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Further, while "half-truths regarding the strength of the [State's] evidence 
against [an accused] should not be condoned," "'[a] defendant's will is not 
overborne simply because he is led to believe that the government's knowledge of 
his guilt is greater than it actually is.'" Montero, 2008 UT App 285, \ 16 (quoting 
Galli, 967 R2d at 936) (citation omitted). 
The totality of the circumstances does not demonstrate coercion in this case 
where the only factors suggesting coercion are a misrepresentation as to the strength 
of the State's evidence and a statement that a deal would be made. These 
circumstances are not, under the facts at hand, sufficiently coercive to overcome 
Jackie's free will. See, e.g., Montero, 2008 UT App 285, f f 12-21 (no coercion where 
interrogation was conducted periodically over six-hour period, accused was 
handcuffed to his chair, and officers used false-friend technique, made 
misrepresentations as to strength of State's case, made statements concerning the 
possibility of a deal, and eighteen-year-old accused was not "particularly 
susceptible to coercion or manipulation"). Hence, Jackie's statements were 
voluntary and not coerced, and an objection to their admission would have been 
futile. Consequently, Defendant's claim of ineffectiveness for failing to object to 
admission of the statements necessarily fails. See Kelley, 2000 UT 41, f^ 26. 
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E. Even absent' the statements from the second interview, 
there is no reasonable likelihood of a different outcome 
Moreo\"' Iher" i:- no pwtonahl" probability ol i different result absent the 
statements from the second interview; The jury still had before it the testimony of 
Officer Folau and Detective Gordon corroborating various parts of Pain's testimony 
and her physical and emotional condition thai niejV !ho photographs cf the duct 
tape on Pam; the testimonv of Diana A H ^ ; rcmioiv.ng , .... - ' . ;VV;.L.: ; ; .»/ 
corroborating •= .r; , .*.* < :/ • - •.: : . A te 
abusi ve tl u - - K- .-^  Mi Priiii'1- iv< I'ipt nf \\\r m-inry. .inJ Ilia! Defendant 
tried repeat?.-4)v to ^et Pam to give him the money; and Jackie's prior inconsistent 
statements from the first interview implicating Defendant in the events of the 
evening. See Subsection B, supra. The jury'was also able to see and hear Pam as she 
testified at trial, permitting them,,,, to ditvitly assess her credible;, rience, 
Defendant s final clain i„ of i„i [effective assistai ice i lecessarily fail s, . .• . 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendant's convictions. 
Respectfully submitted Tunao/ffi 2011. 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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R I JLE 23.B. MOTION TO REMAND FOR FINDINGS NECESSARY TO 
DETERMINATION OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUN-
SEL CLAIM 
(a) Grounds for motion.; time.. \. party to an appeal in a criminal case may 
move the court to remand the case to the trial court for entry of findings of fact, 
necessary for the appellate court's determination of a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel... The motion shall, be available only upon a nonspecula-
tive allegation of facts, not fully appearing in the record on. appeal, which,,, if' 
true, could support a determination that counsel was ineffective. 
The motion shall be filed prior to the filing of the appellant's brief. Upon, a 
showing of good cause, the court may permit a motion to be filed after the filing 
of the appellant's brief. In no event shall the court permit a motion to be filed 
after oral argument. Nothing in this rule shall prohibit the court from. 
remanding the case under this rule on its own motion at any time if the claim 
has been raised and the motion would have been, available to a. party. 
(lb) Content of motion; response; reply. The content of the motion shall 
conform to the requirements of Rule 23. The motion shall include or be 
accompanied by affidavits alleging facts not fully appearing in the record on 
al that show the claimed deficient performance of the attorney. The 
- •*" shall also allege facts that show the claimed prejudice suffered by the 
. as a result of the claimed deficient performance. The motion shall 
also be accompanied by a proposed order or remand that identifies the 
iii! ffectiveness claims and specifies the factual issues relevant to each such 
cl j " i ri to be addressed on remand. 
A response shall be filed within 20 days afte: :i.;: motion is filed. The 
response shall include a proposed order of remand that identifies the ineffec-
tiveness claims and specifies the factual issues relevant to each such claim to be 
addressed by the trial court in the event remand, is granted, unless the 
responding party accepts that proposed by the moving party. Any reply shall be 
filed within 10 days after the response is filed. 
(c) Order of the court. If the requirements of parts (a.) and. (b) of this rule 
have been met, the court may order that the case be temporarily remanded to 
the trial court for the purpose of entry of findings of fact relevant to a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. The order of remand shall identify the 
ineffectiveness claims and specify the factual issues relevant to each such clainjL 
to be addressed by the trial court. The order shall also direct the trial court to 
complete the proceedings on remand within 90 days of issuance of the order of 
remand, absent a finding by the trial court, of good, cause for a. delay of 
reasonable length. 
- If it appears to the appellate court that the appellant's attorney of record, on 
the appeal faces a conflict of interest upon remand, the court shall direct that 
counsel withdraw and that new counsel for the appellant be appointed, or 
retained. 
(d) Effect nient and. the deadlines for briefs shall be 
vacated upon the filing of a motion to remand under this rule. Other procedur-
al steps required by these rules shall not be stayed by a motion for remand, 
unless a stay is ordered by the court upon stipulation or motion of the parties or 
upon the court's motion, 
•(e) Proceedings before the trial court. Upon, remand, the trial, court, shall 
promptly conduct hearings and take evidence as necessary to enter the findings 
of fact necessary to determine the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Any claims of ineffectiveness not identified in the order of remand shall not be 
considered by the trial court on remand, unless the trial court determines that 
the interests of justice or judicial efficiency require consideration of issues not 
specifically identified in the order of remand. Evidentiary hearings shall be 
conducted without a jury and as soon, as practicable after remand. The burden Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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of proving a fact shall be upon the proponent of the fact. The standard of proof 
shall be a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court shall enter written 
findings of fact concerning the claimed deficient performance by counsel and 
the claimed prejudice suffered by appellant as a result, in accordance with the 
order of remand. Proceedings on remand shall be completed within 90 days of 
entry of the order of remand, unless the trial court finds good cause for a delay 
of reasonable length. 
(f) Preparation and transmittal of the record. At the conclusion of all 
proceedings before the trial court, the clerk of the trial court and the court 
reporter shall immediately prepare the record of the supplemental proceedings 
as required by these rules. If the record of the original proceedings before the 
trial court has been transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk of the trial 
court shall immediately transmit the record of the supplemental proceedings 
upon preparation of the supplemental record. If the record of the original 
proceedings before the trial court has not been transmitted to the appellate 
court, the clerk of the court shall transmit the record of the supplemental 
proceedings upon the preparation of the entire record. 
(g) Appellate court determination. Upon receipt of the record from the trial 
court, the clerk of the court shall notify the parties of the new schedule for 
briefing or oral argument under these rules. Errors claimed to have been 
made during the trial court proceedings conducted pursuant to this rule are 
reviewable under the same standards as the review of errors in other appeals. 
The findings of fact entered pursuant to this rule are reviewable under the same 
standards as the review of findings of fact in other appeals. 
[Adopted effective October 1, 1992; amended effective April 1, 1998.] 
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ARTICLE VIII. HEARSAY 
t e n . VIA i ; \ n k / \ : 5 
. (oiiow:: J .ij:initions appl\ ^nder this article: 
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) 
nonverbal conduct nj
 iX :vrM>n i •: is intended by the person as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant,. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement, 
(c) Hearsay. '''Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declar -
ant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth 
of the matter asserted. . _ - • 
(d) Statements 'which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if: 
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or 
hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the 
statement is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the witness 
denies having made the statement or has forgotten, or (B) consistent with the 
declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied cha1 -*e 
against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or m : 
or (C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person; or 
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a pa~*v 
and is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a repress .; 
tive capacity, or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested ~.n 
adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by 
the party to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by 
the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the 
agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) 
a statement by a coconspirator of a party di iring the course and in further-
- ance of the conspiracy. 
[Amended effective October 1, 1992.] 
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OCT 11 2010 
"APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
OCT 2 I 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Samuel Marlin King, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
ORDER DENYING REMAND 
Case No. 20091086-CA 
Before Judges Orme, Roth, and Christiansen. 
This is before the court on a motion for remand under rule 
23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. A remand is 
available only upon "a nonspeculative allegation of facts, not 
fully appearing in the record on appeal, which, if true, could 
support a determination that counsel was ineffective," including 
facts that show "the claimed deficient performance" and "the 
claimed prejudice suffered by the appellant as a result of the . 
claimed deficient performance." Utah R. App. P. 23B (a) , (b) . 
King asserts that trial counsel was ineffective in failing 
to obtain an expert witness and failing to discover medical 
records. Although the motion is properly supported with 
affidavits and otherwise well-presented, overall King has failed 
to establish the likelihood that any such oversight was 
prejudicial. The additional proposed testimony and records are 
cumulative impeachment evidence regarding the victim's general 
credibility. Such additional evidence is not likely to have 
resulted in a different outcome. The victim's testimony was 
supported by other testimony, and it is the jury's province to 
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determine credibility and the weight to give a witness's 
testimony. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is denied. 
Dated this 2l day of October, 2010. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Orme, Judge 
20091086-CA 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on October 21, 2010, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States 
mail or placed in Interdepartmental mailing to be delivered to: 
LINDA M. JONES 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 E 500 S STE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
RYAN D. TENNEY 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E 300 S 6TH FL 
PO BOX 140854 • 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854 
Dated this October 21, 2010. 
Judicial Assistant 
Case No. 20091086 
District Court No. 081907657 
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LINDA M. JONES (5497) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)532-5444 
Attorneys for Defendant 
M,
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( J U L f 5 2010 
APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
SAMUEL MARLIN KING, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
23B MOTION TO REMAND 
THE CASE TO THE TRIAL COURT 
FOR SUPPLEMENTATION OF THE 
RECORD ON APPEAL AND THE 
ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF FACT 
Appellate Case No. 20091086-CA 
Appellant Samuel King is appealing from a judgment of conviction for aggravated 
kidnapping, a first degree felony offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (2008); and 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 
(2008). R. 126-27. The judgment is attached hereto as Addendum A. King maintains 
his due process rights and his right to the effective assistance of counsel were violated 
when trial counsel failed to adequately investigate the case before trial. 
Pursuant to Rule 23B, Utah R. App. P., King respectfully requests that this Court 
remand the case to the trial court for supplementation of the record on appeal with facts 
supporting the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. In connection with the request, 
1 
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King has attached the Affidavits of Glen R. Hanson, Ph.D., D.D.S. (Addendum B), and 
Manny Garcia (Addendum C). In accordance with State v. Johnston, the affidavits con-
tain specific, nonspeculative facts that are readily shown but not contained in the record 
on appeal. 2000 UT App 290, f 10, 13 P.3d 175 (defendant must specify facts "that 
might have helped his case"). The affidavits support that King's attorney was constitu-
tionally deficient in his performance, and the deficient performance resulted in prejudice. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On October 3, 2008, the State filed an information against Jackie Juarez and King 
for aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault. R. 1-1B. On October 6, 2009, the 
trial court began a two-day trial in King's case. R. 96; 121. The State called five 
witnesses to testify: Pamela Westphal, the complaining witness; Juarez, the co-defendant; 
Detective Gordon, the lead detective; Detective Folau, the arresting officer; and Diana 
Miller, a friend of Westphal. The State's witnesses presented the following evidence. 
A. PAMELA WESTPHAL HAS SIGNIFICANT MENTAL HEALTH AND 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE ISSUES AFFECTING HER MENTAL CONDITION. 
Pamela Westphal suffers from depression, methamphetamine-induced psychoses, 
and post-traumatic-stress disorder. R. 152:5-6, 52, 55-56. She is on prescription drugs. 
R. 152:6 (she has taken Zoloft for five years and she takes Trazadone); 152:53. She is a 
drug addict. R. 152:53. She uses crack cocaine. R. 152:52-53. She is an alcoholic. R. 
152:88; seealsoR. 151:199. She mixes drugs and alcohol. R. 152:53. Also, she 
occasionally lives on the streets. R. 152:5. 
2 
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Westphal met King in the fall of 2007, R. 152:4, or in early 2008. R. 152:43. In 
2008, they lived together on 500 East and 3300 South, and then moved to Center Street. 
R. 152:6-7. Westphal borrowed money or sold drugs to pay half the rent on the first 
apartment. R. 152:43-45. The Road Home paid rent on the second apartment. R. 152:45. 
In late 2007 or early 2008 Westphal relied on her mental-illness diagnoses and 
psychoses to apply for a large disability payment from the Social Security Department. 
See R. 152:8, 54-55. In August or September 2008, she received a payment in the 
amount of $26,000. R. 152:8, 47. Westphal and King used some of the money on crack 
cocaine. R. 152:49. Also, with King's help, she opened an account and deposited some 
of the funds. R. 152:49; see also UL at 11, 50 (stating King tried to convince her to put 
money in his account). In addition, she gave $5,000 to King because he "kept harping" 
on her, and she spent "another probably couple of thousand." R. 152:9, 62-63 (stating 
she gave the money to him so he would get away from her). She gave money to strangers 
and to people she knew. R. 152:10-11, 58, 60-61. She withdrew money "[q]uite a few" 
times, and as much as $500 a day. R. 152:57-58. By the end of September 2008, 
Westphal had spent or given away all her money. R. 152:108. 
Within "[a] couple of weeks" or four or five days after Westphal received the 
check from Social Security, she left King. R. 152:47, 74. She claimed she felt tlireatened 
or intimidated by him. R. 152:11-12, 63, 74-75 (stating King "was getting worse" and 
was pushing for more money). According to Westphal, King hit her, and he picked her up 
by the throat and tried to strangle her. R. 152:12, 74-75. 
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After she moved out, she was "homeless for a week or two." R. 152:13, 64. Or 
she rented a suite in Midvale for three weeks. R. 152:42. But see R. 152:64 (she did not 
rent housing but bought clothes). Also, she went to Pioneer Park and the shelter. R. 
152:14. In early October 2008, Westphal moved into Diana Miller's home. R. 152:40, 
41. But see R. 151:190-91 (it was early September). In addition, she found a new 
boyfriend, Bruce, and they spent money on hotels, crack, food, clothing, and cabs. R. 
152:77. Westphal did not track the amount of money she spent on crack or how much 
she used. R. 152:59, 60. She withdrew as much money as she wanted each day and 
spent it on whatever she wanted. R. 152:58. 
On September 25, 2008, Westphal withdrew money from the bank and either gave 
it away or spent it. R. 152:62. In addition, she went to Pioneer Park with Bruce. R. 
152:14. She smoked crack cocaine and shared a pint of vodka with others. R. 152:14-15, 
38, 77 (she drank four hours before "the incident"); see also R. 152:86 (she smoked crack 
four to six hours earlier). After it became dark, people left the park and Westphal became 
separated from Bruce. See R. 152:15. 
According to Westphal, at some point, a black electrical cord was placed around 
her throat. R. 152:15. It was not pulled tight, but placed perfectly. R. 152:16. Westphal 
claimed that King told Juarez to put the cord around her throat, R. 152:16, 84; and King 
and Juarez walked or dragged Westphal to a picnic table. R. 152:16, 84-85. The cord 
was tight when it became caught between slates on the table. R. 152:17-18, 19-20. 
Westphal claimed she was tied to the table and she thought she would break her neck. R. 
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152:76. Also, she claimed that King told a woman named Alaska that Westphal had 
disrespected him. R. 152:18, 22; see also 152:23 (claiming Juarez made the statement). 
According to Westphal, Alaska tried to punch her. R. 152:19-20. In addition, King 
threatened her with a knife, he said he would kill her, and he smacked her a couple of 
times on the back of the head. R. 152:22-23, 81. While at the park, King and Juarez 
drank vodka. 152:23 . • 
After 20 or 30 minutes, King called for a cab. R. 152:21. When it arrived, 
"[King] and [Juarez] told [Westphal] not to say a word" or King "would kill [her]" with 
the knife. R. 152:23. Westphal made conflicting statements about the knife: she reported 
that King held a knife to her side as they got into the cab, R. 152:71-72, 81; she reported 
that King may have put the knife away when they got into the cab, R. 152:82; and she 
claimed King did not have a knife at Pioneer Park. R. 152:124, 153-54. 
The cab took them to King's apartment. When they arrived, King "kept telling 
[her] off about [her] boyfriend, and how much [she] kept disrespecting him, how stupid 
[she] was, and that he was going to kill [her]." R. 152:25. Westphal claimed that King hit 
her on the back of the head, he threatened her, and he said he would take her to the bank 
the next morning for her money. R. 152:25, 26-28, 34. Also, King and Juarez offered 
Westphal something to eat and she refused. She was too upset because she was at the 
apartment "against [her] will." R. 152:26, 85-86. King gave clippers to Westphal to 
clean her fingernails. R. 152:86-87. And they all drank vodka. R. 152:29, 53, 72. 
Westphal testified that at some point King handed a roll of duct tape to Juarez and 
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told her to tape Westphal. R. 152:30-32, 67, 84. As Juarez taped her, Westphal did not 
resist because she was scared and crying. R. 152:30. Juarez taped her wrists and ankles. 
R. 152: 31-32. The tape was snug. R. 152:31. While Westphal was bound, King forced 
her to drink vodka. R. 152:30, 32, 87-89. Also, Westphal claimed that King smacked her 
on the back of the head. R. 152:82. 
According to Westphal, King took a pocketknife and placed it on a hot plate or 
burner to heat it. R. 152:32-33, 73. He threatened to cut out her tongue. R. 152:33. He 
put the knife down when the smoke alarm went off, and they continued to drink. R. 
152:33, 34, 73-74. Westphal stated she was in shock and fearing for her life. R. 152:34-
35 (she was at the apartment for three or four hours). King and Juarez fell asleep, R. 
152:35; and Westphal began to fidget and wiggle and eventually she undid the tape. R. 
152:35-36. She went to a Maverik store and called police. R. 152:36, 94-95. She may 
have said to the clerk, "Here come some of the friends." "I will get shot." R. 152:95. 
Detective Folau responded to Westphal's call and observed duct tape on her wrists 
and ankles. R. 151:59; State's Ex. 1, 2, 15. She appeared to be scared and crying., R. 
151:59. Westphal told Folau that Juarez bound her with tape, R. 151:79, and she directed 
Folau to the apartment on Center Street. See R. 151:62. Westphal then went to the police 
station for an interview. She spoke with Detective Gordon and remembered only bits and 
pieces of the interview. R. 152:96. She asked Gordon to take the tape off "because 
[Juarez's] fingerprints are on here, and I want her to pay." R. 152:152. Also, she told 
Gordon that her ex-boyfriend, Joe, may have had something to do with this. R. 152:99. 
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Gordon described Westphal as emotional, "reversing] back," then talking again, 
volatile, and shell shocked. R. 152:114. Westphal "would go off on things. She would 
talk about Joe, about how maybe he was involved." R. 152:151. And Gordon "would 
just direct her back to the actual point that we were talking about." R. 152:151. Gordon 
thought Westphal had "some mental health issues, but not enough to not track what 
[Gordon] was saying to her, so clearly she has some problems, but she was capable of 
talking to [Gordon] and answering the questions appropriately." R. 152:122. 
During the interview with Gordon, Westphal stated, "I just want people to . . . just 
to quit tryin to kill me." Addendum C, Ex. 1 at 25. Also she claimed that Joe 
"supposedly has a big hit for my head . . . obviously for tomorrow night," and "the price 
has d~, tripled on my head." IcL, at 45, 47. She stated people at the police station "don't 
like me either." IcL at 36. And she claimed that after a car incident in West Jordan "last 
week," Joe called the shelter "and said if I went and testified I'm definitely dead. So I 
didn't go." Id^ at 51. 
Westphal stated she would "end up in the nut house," and that she had not been 
okay "for a long time." IdL at 30. She told Gordon she has "PTSD" and "problems with 
[her] family in jail. A lot of problems." IcL at 38. She said, "I've been pullin' my hair 
out for a while, that's why my hair back here has [a] bald spot and stuff." Id, at 43. She 
said, "I think I had enough of the drugs and alcohol," and "sometimes it doesn't stop 
when I . . . even [when] I quit." Id. at 49. 
Gordon testified that two weeks after the first interview, Westphal showed up at 
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the police department and told Gordon she was "scared to death" that Juarez and King 
were going to get out of jail and kill her. R. 152:123. Also, she told Gordon that King 
did not hold a knife to her side when they got into the cab. R. 152:124. 
After the purported incident here, Westphal went to a detox unit, and she stopped 
using drugs for "a whole four months." R. 152:56-57. She acknowledged at trial that she 
now uses drugs when she slips, R. 152:56, and she had used crack cocaine within the past 
month or two before trial. R. 152:57, 107. 
B. JACKIE JUAREZ MAINTAINED THAT KING DID NOT ASSAULT OR 
KIDNAP WESTPHAL: RATHER JUAREZ PUT TAPE ON WESTPHAL9S 
WRISTS AND ANKLES AND SHE ACTED ALONE. 
The State called Jackie Juarez to testify. She was with King at Pioneer Park on 
September 25, 2008. R. 151:93, 127. She saw Westphal. R. 151:94. Juarez and 
Westphal used drugs; King did not. R. 151:93, 128. Juarez testified that "everybody was 
drinking" Montego Bay Rum. R. 151:93, 96, 127; see also R. 151:96 (King "drank a 
little and stopped a little"). 
According to Juarez, on September 25, Westphal told people that her mother had 
died. R. 151:100. Shortly after she made that statement, Westphal's mother called King 
on the phone. R. 151:100. King handed the phone to Westphal and she spoke to her 
mother. R. 151:169. Also, Juarez had an electrical cord that belonged to Westphal. R. 
151:97, 101, 135. She went up to Westphal and said, "Parn, I've had this cord forever," 
and she draped or dangled the cord around Westphal's neck to return it to her. R. 151:98. 
After dark, Juarez, King, and Alaska went to a picnic table and Westphal joined 
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them. R. 151:103-04. Juarez claimed King was hurt over his relationship with Westphal. 
R. 151:105, 178-79. Also, Alaska tried to hit Westphal, but Juarez shielded her. R. 
151:107-08. 
Juarez became concerned that Westphal had no place to sleep. R. 151:108-09, 
134. She invited Westphal to go with them to King's apartment. R. 151:109. Westphal 
expressed that she was scared because King was mad at her, and King expressed that he 
did not want Westphal at the apartment. R. 151:109-10, 133,177-78. He said Westphal 
could get her clothes. R. 151:173; see also R. 151:134. But he did not want her to stay. 
R. 151:133. Juarez assured Westphal that nothing would happen to her. R. 151:109. She 
said, "Let's go over to the house and get something to eat. We can talk. Everything's 
goingtobe all right." R. 151:110, 141, 177. 
According to Juarez, King called a cab, and when they arrived at the apartment, 
Juarez began to fix dinner. R. 151:110-11, 144; see also R. 151:149 (it was about 9:30). 
King went to his room in the back. R. 151:111. When he returned, he gave a knife to 
Westphal to clean her fingernails. R. 151:111-12, 144, 166. Juarez described Westphal 
as a mess, filthy, dirty and nasty. R. 151:145. King tried to get Westphal to eat, and they 
all drank vodka. R. 151:96, 112; see also R. 151:147-48 (she ate a little meal and they 
started to drink again). Also, King gave clean clothes to Westphal. R. 151:134. 
Westphal sat at the table at the apartment and talked. R. 151:113. King and 
Westphal argued and debated, but King "didn't threaten her." R. 151:115-16. King 
made a motion with a cigarette but did not burn or touch Westphal. R. 151:117; see also 
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R. 151:116 (Westphal was not bruised or touched that evening); 151:161 (King did not 
try to strike Westphal earlier at the park). 
As they continued to drink, King said Westphal could not sleep in the bedroom 
withhim. R. 151:113-14. She could use a sleeping bag on the floor. R. 151:114. Juarez 
planned to sleep on a futon in the living room. R. 151:114,150. 
According to Juarez, if Westphal drinks or uses drugs, her personality changes; 
she is different, "her mind [is]n't there," she makes no sense and says "crazy stuff." R. 
151:102, 128, 130, 159-60. That night, Westphal began to get on Juarez's nerves. R. 
151:148. "She just wouldn't shut up." R. 151:148,156. Juarez did not remember taping 
Westphal, but testified that she must have. R. 151:119. She maintained that King was 
notinvolved. R. 151:121. Juarez had the tape for moving boxes. R. 151:115, 152. She 
and Westphal were "messing around," so she must have taped Westphal. R. 151:153. 
King was not in the room; he was in the back bedroom. R. 151:119,121 ("I was the only 
one in the room. He didn't tape her up"); 151:154, 164, 166. Juarez taped Westphal's 
mouth, and she thought she taped Westphal's hands and feet. R. .151:154-55. Juarez 
acknowledged she may have said she would take Westphal to the bank in the morning. 
R. 151:121-22, 156. 
Juarez then passed out or fell asleep. R. 151:156. She was awakened by an 
officer shining a light in her face. R. 151:157. She may have said "Come in," but she did 
not remember. IcL Juarez was arrested for robbery and kidnapping, R. 151:70, and 
interviewed twice by Detective Gordon. Juarez denied making statements implicating 
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King. R. 151:118, 122-23, 178-79. She maintained she was responsible for events that 
night, and King was not involved. R. 151:185-86. Juarez entered a plea on a 
misdemeanor count. See R. 151:90; Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-101, 76-5-102 (2008). And 
the State dismissed the original charges against her. R. 151:89. 
C. GORDON USED TACTICS TO MANIPULATE JUAREZ'S STATEMENTS. 
Gordon acknowledged interviewing Juarez twice. The first interview was 
recorded. R. 152:148, 126. According to Gordon, Juarez said the following: she knew 
about Westphal's money, R. 152:127; King wanted Westphal to get clothes from the 
apartment, R. 152:127; Westphal did not want to go to the apartment, but Juarez assured 
"her that everything would be okay," R. 152:128; King and Alaska tried to hit Westphal 
at the park, but Juarez blocked them, R. 152:128; King said things at the apartment to 
scare Westphal, see R. 152:129; and Juarez refused to say who placed tape on Westphal's 
wrists and ankles. R. 152:129-30, 137. Overall, Juarez did not deny involvement and her 
admissions backed up parts of Westphal's story. R. 152:149. 
During the second interview, Gordon acknowledged using trickery and deception. 
She testified that officers are allowed to "use any tactic we want." R. 152:150; 152:133. 
She "bluffed [Juarez] quite a bit" to see if Juarez would change her story. R. 152:132. "I 
mean as long as we're not assaulting them or berating them or, you know, beating them 
down, or you know, touching them or any of those sorts of things, we can run any gambit 
of things [. W]e can say[,] 'You're going to get a deal out of this,' which may or may not 
be true in some cases. We can tell them that the other person has rolled on them. We can 
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tell them any number of things. You know, in my current job[,] I do special victims, 
which are mostly like rape or child molestation type cases, and you'll even get there and 
start telling [them] that [we] understand their perverse ways so that they'll talk to [us]." 
R. 152:132-33. The second interview took place at the jail. R. 152:132. Relevant parts 
of the interview were not recorded. R. 152:156. 
Gordon told Juarez that technicians found King's prints on the duct tape, R. 152: 
136; and that King was blaming her for kidnapping and assaulting Westphal. R. 152:133, 
149. Gordon was not authorized to negotiate with Juarez; nevertheless, she represented 
that prosecutors would give Juarez a deal. R. 152:133-34. According to Gordon, her 
tactics worked: "in this particular case," Juarez "gave me a little bit more information 
than she gave me the first time, and reiterated some of the same things she had already 
told me." R. 152:150. Gordon maintained that Juarez implicated King, and the two of 
them were in on it together, R. 152:155-56; Juarez claimed King wanted money, R. 
152:134; Juarez claimed King was "enraged at [Westphal]," because she was having sex 
with somebody else, R. 152:135; Juarez claimed King was mad at Westphal and wanted 
to hurt her for giving money away to people at the park, R. 152:136; Juarez stated if she 
had not been there, King would have killed Westphal, R. 152:135; and Juarez expressed 
concern that technicians may find her fingerprints on the duct tape. R. 152:137. 
The State's final witness, Diana Miller, was not at the park or the apartment on 
September 25 or 26, 2008; she testified that Westphal now lives with her. R. 151:191. 
At the end of the case, the jury found King guilty as charged. R. 152:190-91. 
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ARGUMENT 
DEFENSE COUNSEL PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE. THE 
CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD 
WITH EVIDENCE. 
King's attorney failed to investigate issues relating to Westphal5s mental 
condition. The failure to investigate qualified as ineffective assistance of counsel since 
an investigation would support that Westphal's history of mental illness and drug abuse 
influenced her ability to accurately perceive, recall, and recount events. A person with 
the mental health and substance abuse issues described by Westphal would have impaired 
cognitive processes. Indeed, an investigation would have been relevant to King's case 
where the State relied on Westphal's perceptions to prosecute King. In addition, King 
was prejudiced by the ineffective assistance of counsel and the lack of a proper 
investigation. 
A. DEFENSE COUNSEL HAS A DUTY TO INVESTIGATE ISSUES 
RELEVANT TO THE DEFENDANT'S CASE. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides a criminal 
defendant with the right to the effective assistance of counsel at all stages of the criminal 
prosecution. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). A defendant 
raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must show that (1) his attorney's 
performance fell "'below an objective standard of reasonableness,'" and (2) "'but for"5 
the deficient performance, "'there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial 
would have been different.'" State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14, f 68, 152 P.3d 321 (citation 
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omitted); see also State v. Johnson, 2007 UT App 184, f 38, 163 P.3d 695 (in proving 
ineffective assistance, "'[DJefendant must overcome the strong presumption that his trial 
counsel rendered adequate assistance, by persuading the court that there was no 
conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions'") (citation omitted). 
In addition, "'[t]he Sixth Amendment imposes on counsel a duty to investigate, 
because reasonably effective assistance must be based on professional decisions[,] and 
informed legal choices can be made only after investigation of options.'" State v. 
Crestani, 111 P.2d 1085, 1090 (Utah Ct App. 1989) (quoting Strickland. 466 U.S. at 
680); see also State v. Huzzins, 920 P.2d 1195,1199 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) ('"counsel has 
a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes 
particular investigations unnecessary'") (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91). An 
adequate investigation "sets the foundation for counsel's strategic decisions about how to 
build the best defense." Hales, 2007 UT 14, % 69. 
On the other hand, "'a decision not to investigate cannot be considered a tactical 
decision.'" State v. Gordon, 913 P.2d 350, 356 (Utah 1996) (quoting State v. Templin, 
805 P.2d 182,188 (Utah 1990)). 
If counsel does not adequately investigate the underlying facts of a case, including 
the availability of prospective defense witnesses, counsel's performance cannot 
fall within the "wide range of reasonable professional assistance." This is because 
a decision not to investigate cannot be considered a tactical decision. It is only 
after an adequate inquiry has been made that counsel can make a reasonable 
decision to call or not to call particular witnesses for tactical reasons. 
Templin, 805 P.2d at 188 (footnote omitted); id at 188 n. 25 ("Several courts have held 
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that criminal defendants have been denied the right to assistance of counsel in situations 
where counsel did not make a reasonable investigation into the possibility of obtaining 
prospective defense witnesses"); see also State v. Walker, 2010 UT App 157, f 15, 658 
Utah Adv. Rep. 41 (lack of investigation renders counsel's assistance ineffective). 
Moreover, the duty to investigate includes the duty to assess whether counsel 
should call an expert to assist or to testify at trial. In State v. Hales, the State charged the 
defendant with the murder of a child, who sustained brain injuries when he was five 
months old. 2007 UT 14, f 1. The State relied on an expert's interpretation of CT scans 
to implicate the defendant in the child's death. IcL at ffi[ 72-74. The jury found the defen-
dant guilty, and he appealed. LL at fflf 1-2. He claimed his trial attorneys were ineffective 
for failing to obtain an expert to interpret the CT scans for the defense. IcL at % 67. The 
Utah Supreme Court agreed. It ruled the interpretation of CT scans "was critical to the 
State's case against Hales." IcL at f 69. Also, the trial attorneys were on notice at the 
time of the preliminary hearing that the CT scans were pivotal. IcL at f<f 74-78. The "cen-
trality" of this evidence made it necessary for the defense to obtain an expert. IcL at f 80. 
Moreover, the court ruled that the trial attorneys' decision not to use an expert was 
tactical but unreasonable. IcL at ffl[ 73,79-80. And the unreasonable decision prejudiced 
the defendant since an expert would have provided a "competing interpretation" for the 
CT scans that likely would "cast doubt" on the State's theory that the defendant caused 
the child's death. Id at ^ 91; see also McHenrv v. State, 177 P.3d 981, 985-86 (Kan. Ct. 
App. 2008) (where there is no physical evidence and the case turns on the credibility of 
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the prosecution's witness, defense counsel's failure to investigate is ineffective); Barkell 
v. Crouse, 468 F.3d 684, 699 (10th Cir. 2006) (trial counsel's failure to retain an expert to 
assist with the cross-examination of witnesses may result in constitutional 
ineffectiveness). Where the pivotal facts at issue involved a medical explanation, it was 
necessary to obtain an expert for the defense. See Hales, 2007 UT 14, \ 80. 
(1) King's Attorney Failed to Investigate. 
(a) Pretrial Information Raised Questions About WestphaVs Mental Condition. 
In this case, the State charged King and Juarez with aggravated assault and 
aggravated kidnapping. R. 1-1B. The State relied primarily on Westphal's perceptions 
of events for its prosecution, see R. 1A, where Westphal claimed that King and Juairez 
took her against her will to an apartment near the capitol, bound her with tape, and 
assaulted her. See, e.g.. Addendum C, Ex, 1 (interview with Westphal). Westphal 
specifically implicated King in the crimes by claiming he directed Juarez to place a cord 
around her throat as the initial aggressive act at Pioneer Park, R. 152:16; he provoked a 
woman named Alaska to assault her at the park, R. 152:18; he hit her, threatened her with 
a knife, and threatened her life, R. 152:22, 25, 26, 28, 32, 33; he directed her to get into a 
cab at knife point, R. 152:71, 72, 81; but see R. 152:82 (lines 24-25), 124 (lines 7-9), 153 
(lines 21-25); he threatened to take her to the bank in the morning to withdraw money 
from her account, R. 152:28-29, 34; he directed Juarez to put tape on Westphal's wrists 
and ankles at the apartment, R. 152:30-32; and he forced alcohol down Westphal's throat. 
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Id. Notably, the State did not present physical evidence implicating King in crime. 
In addition, in connection with making criminal allegations, Westphal exhibited 
impaired mental and emotional processes. For example, when she reported events to 
Detective Gordon, she claimed that a person named Joe Hernandez wanted to kill her. 
See Addendum C, Ex. 1 at 45-47. She expressed that other people were after her to kill 
her or do her harm, idL, at 25; and she made references to her mental illnesses and drug 
use. See UL at 30, 38, 49. Moreover, prior to trial, King's attorney was on notice that 
Westphal had been diagnosed with various mental illnesses and methamphetamine-
induced psychoses, Addendum C, f 2; she relied on her mental illness diagnoses and 
psychoses to apply for a lump sum payment from Social Security in late 2007 or early 
2008, ici at f^ 4; she used methamphetamine for years before her diagnoses, and she 
received the psychoses diagnosis from a therapist at Valley Mental Health: Safe Haven, 
see id_ at f 2 (she used meth for several years); see also R. 152:52 (she used meth heavily 
for two years); she used and abused other drugs, see_ Addendum C, f^tf 2, 5, 6; she 
received substance abuse treatment from Store Front, id_ at ^[ 2, 4; and she had been 
charged with several offenses, some of them relating to substance abuse. IcL at f 8. Also, 
counsel learned that Westphal received a large payment from Social Security in August 
1
 The investigating officers made no attempt to locate or collect the cord that Juarez 
draped around Westphal's neck at Pioneer Park. R. 152:142-43. In addition, Westphal 
could not confirm that King used a knife presented at trial. See, e.g., R. 152:66 (saying "I 
don't know"). Officers did not recover usable fingerprints in the case. R. 152:121. And 
Westphal had no bruises or marks on her as a result of the alleged events. See Addendum 
C,Ex. 1 at 43-44. 
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or September 2008; she spent a significant, but unknown, amount of money on crack 
cocaine; and she used crack cocaine on September 25, 2008. Id^ at ^ 5-6. 
(b) The Research Supports that a Person with WestphaVs History Likely Has 
Significantly Impaired Cognitive Processes. 
Although counsel was aware of the facts surrounding Westphal's mental 
condition, see, e.g., R. 151:50, 55, he failed to properly investigate the facts for King's 
defense. See_ Addendum C, \ 10. Indeed, an investigation would support that a person 
with Westphal's history of mental illnesses and drug abuse likely had impaired cognitive 
processes and perceptions. According to the research, methamphetamine or cocaine 
abuse has long-lasting and sometimes permanent effects on the brain, altering a person's 
perception of, ability to recall, and ability to recount events. Addendum B, ^ j 6. Even 
short term use of methamphetamine or cocaine can have dramatic effects, including 
hallucinations, hyperthermia, paranoia, amnesia, anxiety, confusion, unconsciousness, 
and in some cases, death. Id. 
In addition, nationally recognized medical organizations qualify drug abuse or 
addiction as a mental illness or a mental disorder. IcL at J^ 7. Drug addiction is a complex 
brain disease that changes the brain structure in ways seen with other mental disorders, 
including depression, anxiety, and schizophrenia. Failure to properly and aggressively 
treat an addiction will jeopardize a person's chance of recovery. IcL 
Moreover, use of methamphetamine literally damages the nerve endings of the 
human brain cells, resulting in cognitive impairments. IcLdX*{ 8(a). Studies have 
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revealed that methamphetamme users experience severe structural and functional changes 
in areas of the brain associated with emotion, memory, and decision making, which 
account for a break down in emotional and cognitive responses and functioning. LL at ^  
8(f). When used regularly and in high doses, even over a short period of time, 
methamphetamme causes long-lasting damage to the central nervous system. Id. at f 
8(b). Long-term effects include inability to properly assess circumstances, anxiety, 
confusion, insomnia, mood disturbances, paranoia, visual and auditory hallucinations, 
and delusions. IcL Some of the effects of methamphetamme abuse are in part reversible 
and recoverable after two years. Other effects have not shown recovery even after two 
years, indicating long-lasting or irreversible damage. Id. at <[ 8(f). 
An investigation would support that persistent and long-term use of methampheta-
mme results in a medical diagnosis for methamphetamine-induced psychoses. Id. at ^  
8(c). An individual with a psychoses diagnosis can experience significant impairment of 
cognitive processes - for months or even years - after discontinuing use of methampheta-
mme. IcL Stress can trigger a spontaneous recurrence of a methamphetamine-induced 
psychosis in individuals diagnosed as psychotic. IdL at f 8(d). Also, crack cocaine may 
trigger and exacerbate the psychosis effect in a person susceptible to methamphetamine-
induced psychoses; and the effects can last for weeks or longer. Id. at^ f 8(e). 
Likewise, cocaine used in large amounts or over a significant period of time 
causes a more intense high, restlessness, irritability, anxiousness, vertigo, and paranoia. 
Id. at fflf 6, 9(d). Cocaine abusers experience severe medical complications associated 
19 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
with the drug use, including disturbances in heart rhythm, heart attacks, strokes, seizures, 
headaches, abdominal pain, and nausea. IcL at \ 9(d). Repeated cocaine use causes 
sensitivity to the anxiety-producing effects of the drug, meaning increased irritability, 
restlessness, paranoia, and at times, a loss of touch with reality. IcL at ^ 9(e). Also, 
chronic users experience a loss of appetite, weight loss, and malnourishment. M. 
Given Westphal's history and the pivotal importance of her perceptions to the 
prosecution, the above information would have been relevant to King's defense. See, e.g.. 
State v. Long, 111 P.2d 483, 488 (Utah 1986) ("perhaps the more important factors 
affecting the accuracy" of a person's ability to perceive events are those factors 
originating within the person, including drug or alcohol use); State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 
785, 788 (Utah 1984) (evidence of drug use is admissible "if it shows that it impaired the 
witness's perception of the events to which he testified"); State v. Hubbard, 601 P.2d 
929, 930 (Utah 1979) ("It is quite universally accepted" that use of narcotics in some 
circumstances may bear "upon the credibility of the witness"). As part of the defense, 
King's attorney should have investigated how mental illnesses and drug abuse - as 
described by Westphal - likely would have impaired a person's cognitive processes, 
functions, and perceptions. 
Yet the record is silent on the issues. See Record. Instead, the prosecution and the 
defense both elicited testimony from Westphal concerning her mental illnesses and drug 
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use. While that testimony was pertinent, it failed to shed light on the relevant science. 
Moreover, defense counsel's cross-examination on the issues allowed Westphal to 
deny the effects of her mental illnesses {see R. 152:52, 54, 57), thereby conveying 
incorrect information to the jury. See Addendum B, ^ 15, 17; see also id. at f 6 
(Westphal likely was "unaware of her own compromised processes"); see also State v. 
Clopten. 2009 UT 84, ffl[ 16, 21, 223 P.3d 1103 (cross-examination has its own 
shortcomings, particularly since witnesses may not be aware of their own limitations). 
Since counsel failed to investigate, his assistance was constitutionally defective. 
See, e.g.. State v. Ott 2010 UT 1, \ 38, 647 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (trial counsel's omissions 
are not excusable if there is no conceivable beneficial value to the defendant); Hales, 
2007 UT f 4, f 80 (since the medical evidence was central to the case, it was necessary 
for defense counsel to investigate and to retain an expert); State v. Ison, 2006 UT 26, \ 
32, 135 P.3d 864 (trial counsel may not be excused for his failure to pursue a course of 
action in the case, even if the course is an open question in the jurisdiction); Gordon, 913 
2
 Westphal acknowledged mental illness diagnoses and a diagnosis for psychoses. See R. 
152:5, 6. She used methamphetamine for years and received her psychoses diagnosis 
while being treated at Safe Haven. R. 152:52, 54-56. She described herself as a drug 
addict and alcoholic. R. 152:53, 56-57, 88. She used prescription drugs for years, and 
she used drugs and alcohol together. R. 152:6, 53. Westphal spent an unspecified 
amount of money on an unknown quantity of crack cocaine for a time before September 
25, 2008. R. 152:49, 52, 58-60, 77, 108. She withdrew money from the bank on 
September 25, and spent it or gave it away. R. 152:62. She smoked crack cocaine and 
shared vodka with others on September 25. R. 152:14-15, 38, 77. By the end of 
September, Westphal had spent all her money. R. 152:108. She had not received effec-
tive or successful treatment for her abuse and mental illnesses: she stopped using drugs at 
one point for four months, and currently uses if she slips up. R. 152:56-57. Westphal 
smoked crack cocaine as recently as a month or two before trial. R. 152:57, 107. 
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P.2d at 356 ("ca decision not to investigate cannot be considered a tactical decision'") 
(citation omitted); Crestani, 111 P.2d at 1090 (counsel is able to make informed choices 
about a defense only after proper investigation); State v. Moore, 2009 UT App 386, \ 10, 
223 P.3d 1137 (counsel was ineffective when he failed to highlight inconsistencies). 
(2) Proper Investigation Would Support Use of an Expert Witness. 
If defense counsel had properly investigated the circumstances and the law in this 
case, he would have been able to make reasonable decisions about presenting King's 
defense to the jury. See. Crestani, 111 P.2d at 1090 (counsel can make informed choices 
only after engaging in a reasonable investigation). For example, Utah law supports the 
use of an expert to assist in presenting a defense. 
Specifically, Rule 702 governs expert evidence. The Utah Supreme Court enacted 
the current rule in 2007. It states the following: 
(a) Subject to the limitations in subsection (b), if scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or 
to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion 
or otherwise. 
(b) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the basis 
for expert testimony if the scientific, technical, or other principles or methods 
underlying the testimony meet a threshold showing that they (i) are reliable, (ii) 
are based upon sufficient facts or data, and (iii) have been reliably applied to the 
facts of the case. 
(c) The threshold showing required by subparagraph (b) is satisfied if the 
principles or methods on which such knowledge is based, including the 
sufficiency of facts or data and the manner of their application to the facts of the 
case, are generally accepted by the relevant expert community. 
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Utah R.Evid. 702 (2010). 
The Utah Supreme Court recently stated that expert evidence is admissible if it 
meets the following conditions: first, the expert must base his opinion "on reliable scien-
tific, technical, or other specialized knowledge." Eskelson v. Davis Hospital and Medical 
Center, 2010 UT 15, f 8, 651 Utah Adv. Rep. 33. Second, the expert must support his 
testimony with sufficient facts and he must reliably apply his experience to the facts of 
the case. IcL. at fflf 16-19 (the expert relied on the deposition of a witness to formulate an 
opinion; and based on the deposition, the expert could opine that a child suffered a 
perforated eardrum while in the defendant's care). And third, the expert's testimony 
must assist the jury. M at If 20 (evidence that "is cumulative or more prejudicial than 
probative" is not admissible). 
In addition, the Utah Supreme Court recently reiterated that Rule 702 allows an 
expert to testify in the form of a lecture or a dissertation on a technical or specialized 
issue in the case. In State v. Clopten, the court addressed use of expert evidence to 
educate the jury on factors contributing to inaccurate eyewitness identification. The court 
quoted from the advisory committee note for Rule 702 as follows: "cIt might be important 
in some cases for an expert to educate the factfinder about general principles, without 
attempting to apply these principles to the specific facts of the case.'" 2009 UT 84, \ 36 
(quoting Utah R. Evid. 702, advisory comm. note (2007)). Also, the court stated, 
Typically, an expert is called by a criminal defendant to explain how certain 
factors relevant to the identification in question could have produced a mistake. 
The expert may or may not be familiar with the facts of the case prior to the 
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testimony, and in any case will not offer an opinion on whether the specific 
eyewitness identification is accurate or not. Instead, the relevant research is 
discussed in more general terms, thus allowing the jury to apply the information to 
whatever degree it sees fit. 
1<L_ at \ 19. The court ruled that an expert's dissertation on eyewitness identification is 
beneficial to a case for two reasons. First, a dissertation educates the jury on factors 
influencing an eyewitness's perceptions; and second, it quantifies known information, 
i.e., how a lapse in time affects an eyewitness's memory. Id^ at f^ 20. In addition, an 
expert is allowed to "'give a dissertation or exposition' of factors" for a case u[a]s long as 
the expert does not attempt to tell the jury that a specific eyewitness identification either 
is or is not accurate." IcL at \ 36 (internal citation omitted); see also State v. Worthen* 
2009 UT 79, f 31, 222 P.3d 1144 ("a defendant may present evidence that casts doubt on 
the State's ability to prove all the elements of the crime"). 
According to the court, "[w]hen expert testimony is used correctly, the end result 
is a jury that is better able to reach a just decision." Clop ten, 2009 UT 84, \ 20. The 
court considered expert evidence to be particularly helpful in cases of eyewitness 
identification because juries typically are unaware of deficiencies in human perceptions 
and memory, and juries tend to give great weight to the testimony of an eyewitness. See 
UL_ at <|[ 15. In that regard, the court ruled "that the testimony of a qualified expert 
regarding factors that have been shown to contribute to inaccurate eyewitness 
identifications should be admitted whenever it meets the requirements of rule 702 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence." IL at \ 30; see also Long, 721 P.2d at 488 ("perhaps the more 
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important factors affecting the accuracy o f a person's perceptions "are those factors 
originating within the observer" including such factors as "drug or alcohol use"). 
Utah law also supports the admissibility of expert evidence to assist the jury in 
assessing whether a witness has the mental capacity to accurately perceive events and to 
recount them truthfully. In State v. Adams, 2000 UT 42, 5 P.3d 642, the complaining 
witness, Carleen, claimed the defendant sexually molested her. See id^ at f f 5-6. Under 
an earlier version of Rule 702, the State called Dr. Hawks, a psychologist, to testify 
whether Carleen could have been coached to make the claims. IcL at \ 6. Carleen had 
Down's Syndrome and was unable to read or write. She was 34 years old and had the 
cognitive abilities of a three and a half year old. Id^ at *| 2. Dr. Hawks had specialized 
training and knowledge. IcL at f^ 18. He evaluated Carleen and relied on her statements 
and history. Se£ id^ at ffl[ 6, 11, 16, 18. He testified "it was 'probably not likely'" that 
Carleen had the mental capacity or the sophistication to be coached in her allegations. Id. 
at T| 13; see also id. at Tfl[ 6, 11. 
The defendant objected to the opinion evidence, and the Utah Supreme Court 
upheld it: it stated that Dr. Hawks "did not offer a direct opinion of Carleen's truthfulness 
about the alleged sexual abuse." IcL at ^ 13. He offered an opinion about Carleen's 
general cognitive abilities and whether she was capable of fabricating a story. Id. 
Consequently, the evidence was proper under the rale. M at f^ 14 (the rules of evidence 
do "not prohibit an expert such as Dr. Hawks from giving testimony from which a jury 
could infer the veracity of the witness"); State v. Wetzel 868 P.2d 64, 68 (Utah 1993) ("a 
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psychologist, a psychiatrist, or a similar expert" may give an opinion of a diagnostic or 
evaluative nature "based on statements made during an interview if the opinion cdoes not 
cross the line from being a statement of the basis of an expert opinion . . . to being a 
comment on the truthfulness on a particular occasion"5) (citation omitted). 
The above principles apply in this case. An expert was available to consult and 
assist with King's defense. See infra, Arg. A.(2)(a). Yet King's attorney failed to consult 
with a professional or engage in an investigation of the issues. See^ infra, Arg. A.(2)(b). 
(a) A Qualified Expert Would Have Consulted with King's Attorney During 
Trial, and Testified that WestphaVs Mental Health History and Drug Use Likely 
Compromised Her Ability to Accurately Perceive and Interpret Events, Thereby 
Impacting on Her Credibility as a Witness. 
As set forth above, Westphal was the State's key witness at trial: the State relied 
on her perceptions to prosecute King. Also, both parties made reference to her mental 
health and drug abuse history in pretrial proceedings and at trial. See_ supra, Arg. 
A.(l)(a); supra footnote 2, herein; see also R. 151:50, 55 (opening statements). While 
that evidence was relevant to King's defense, it was not enough. Information as to how 
Westphal's mental condition influenced her perceptions would have assisted the jury. 
See Long, 721 P.2d at 488-89 ("perhaps the more important factors affecting the accuracy 
o f a person's perceptions are those factors originating within the person, including "drug 
or alcohol use"); Hubbard, 601 P.2d at 930 (a person's use of narcotics may bear on his 
credibility as a witness). 
To that end, the supplemental facts here support that Dr. Glen Hanson is a pro-
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fessor of pharmacology and toxicology at the University of Utah College of Pharmacy. 
Addendum B. He holds a D.D.S. from the University of California, Los Angeles; and a 
Ph.D. in pharmacology from the University of Utah. Addendum B, f^ 1. He has held 
numerous positions and received honors for his research on mental illness and drug abuse 
issues, and their effects on the central nervous system. See_ id^ at ^j 2-4, 7, and Exhibit 1, 
attached thereto. He has made hundreds of presentations in his professional and expert 
capacity; he has testified before Congress and the Utah Legislature and as an expert for 
the prosecution and the defense in several trials. Also, he has co-authored and edited 
more than 200 articles and has served on the editorial board of major pharmacology and 
neuroscience journals. Addendum B, f12-3, 5. 
Dr. Hanson conducts research at the University of Utah to elucidate the bases for 
neurological and psychiatric disorders, and the causes and consequences of drug abuse 
and addiction. IcL at f 4. His area of expertise focuses on the neurochemical effects of 
psychostimulants; he has worked extensively with drug users. IcL Dr. Hanson has 
researched, tested, evaluated, and documented dramatic changes that occur in the brain 
after abuse with such stimulants as the amphetamines and cocaine. IcL The research has 
been confirmed, replicated, and validated many times over the years, and is approved and 
accepted as reliable by scientists and professionals. IcL at \ 4. Indeed, the state and 
federal governments identify methamphetamine and cocaine use as dangerous and toxic. 
See Genetic Science Learning Center, Drugs of Abuse, http ://learn. genetics .Utah, edu/ 
content/addiction/drugs/abuse.html; U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., http://www.justice. 
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gov/dea/concem/meth.html. Dr. Hanson is qualified to consult and to testify as an expert 
with respect to the mental and emotional conditions and impairments of a person with 
mental health diagnoses and a history of drug use and abuse. See Addendum B, Ex. 1. 
He bases his opinions on reliable scientific and specialized knowledge. 
If Dr. Hanson had been consulted in King's case, he would have been available to 
assist counsel in preparation for trial and to inform the jury about mental health 
diagnoses, drug use and abuse, and brain disorders and impairments. See Addendum B; 
see also Utah R. Evid. 702, advisory comm. note ("[i]t might be important in some cases 
for an expert to educate the factfinder about general principles"); Clopten, 2009 UT 84, 
ffi[ 15, 19-20 (juries are unaware of deficiencies in human perception; and the rules 
support expert evidence on factors contributing to eyewitness inaccuracies); Adams, 2000 
UT 42, Tf 13 (an expert can offer an opinion about cognitive abilities and whether a 
person is capable of fabricating a story); Wetzel, 868 P.2d at 68 (an expert may give an 
opinion of an evaluative nature "based on statements made during an interview if the 
opinion 'does not cross the line from being a statement of the basis of an expert opinion . 
. . to being a comment on the truthfulness on a particular occasion'") (citation omitted); 
State v. Clovten, 2008 UT App 205, If 34, 186 P.3d 1004 (Thome, J., concurring) (a live 
witness should be allowed to "address the particular circumstances" of a case). He would 
have been available to review Westphal's interview and to observe her at trial to reliably 
apply his experiences and knowledge to this case. See, e.g., Addendum B, ffi[ 10, 19. 
Specifically, Dr. Hanson would have been able to advise counsel and to testify at 
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trial that a person with a history of mental illnesses and drug abuse - as described by 
Westphal - likely would have impaired emotional and cognitive functioning, processes, 
and responses. Addendum B, f 11. Individually and in combination, the mental illnesses 
and drug use may contribute to inaccurate perceptions, an inability to process events and 
circumstances, a distorted or exaggerated sense of reality, disorientation, paranoia, 
irritability, sensitivity to sound and touch, confusion, hallucinations, hyperthermia, 
amnesia, anxiety, and/or brain damage. M For a person with Westphal5s mental 
illnesses and history, benign events and even friendly gestures may be misinterpreted as 
against her will or aggressive; also, an unkind look or harmless gesture may be perceived 
as threatening, aggressive, or a conspiracy to commit crime or do harm. IdL at f^ 12. 
Dr. Hanson would have been able to illustrate how someone with Westphal5s 
history and condition may misperceive facts: a benign cord draped around the neck may 
be interpreted as a threat to kidnap; a harmless remark from a person who was once 
friendly may be perceived as a threat against her life or intimidating; a persistent or 
repeated suggestion or even a friendly invitation may be construed as an act against her 
will; an innocent act may be linked to perceptions of hostility; and one person's conduct 
may qualify as a conspiracy involving others - even when the others are not actually 
present or involved. Addendum B, f 13. 
Moreover, as an expert, Dr. Hanson would have been available to provide accurate 
information, where Westphal conveyed incorrect facts to the jury about drug use and 
mental illness. For example, she claimed that a methamphetamine-induced psychosis is 
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not persistent. Setz R. 152:52. Dr. Hanson would have been able to clarify that 
Westphal's denials about the effects of her mental illness are typical of a person with a 
psychosis. Addendum B, ^  15. Research shows that the effects of methamphetamine on 
the central nervous system and its functions can be long term and perhaps permanent. Id^ 
Since Westphal admittedly used illegal drugs after her psychosis diagnosis, see R. 
152:56-57, 107, her drug use would likely cause a psychosis to flair with long-lasting 
effects. Addendum B, fflf 8(e), 15. In that regard, Dr. Hanson's information about mental 
illness and drug use would dispute Westphal's claims in ways that undermined her 
credibility: where she continued to use drugs (see supra, footnote 2), her cognitive 
processes likely would continue to be influenced by psychoses. Addendum B, ^  8(e), 
15; also compare R. 152:57, 86 (Westphal claimed that on September 25, she was no 
longer high from the crack cocaine she had used earlier, but was sober); and Addendum 
B, |^ 17 (Westphal's statement could be partially trae: while the short-term euphoria likely 
had worn off after she ingested crack on September 25, it is likely that a person with 
Westphal's mental illnesses and drug history would continue to experience impaired 
cognitive functioning and responses long after use of the drug). 
Unless a drug user - like Westphal - were to receive aggressive intervention and 
consistent dependable treatment for the abuse and mental illnesses, her ability to perceive 
events and to react normally likely would be compromised for a long period of time. 
Addendum B, ^  16. Also, she may be unaware of her own compromised processes. LL 
In this case, an expert was available to advise defense counsel on the issues and to testify 
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at trial to assist the jury in assessing the issues. An expert was available to provide 
insight into Westphal's conditions, and to discuss how mental illness and drug use may 
influence and impair a person's perceptions. In addition, an expert was available to point 
out to the jury that some of Westphal's claims about her mental illnesses and drug abuse 
were incorrect, raising substantial doubts about her credibility. 
(b) Since King's Attorney Failed to Consult with an Expert, His Assistance Was 
Constitutionally Deficient 
Under the circumstances of this case, an attorney providing reasonable 
professional assistance would have presented the evidence relevant to King's defense. 
Since the issues concerning Westphal's mental illnesses and drug use were central to the 
case and scientific in nature, it would have been evident to a reasonable attorney that the 
defense should consult with an expert on mental health and drug abuse issues. See Utah 
R. Evid. 702, advisory comm. note ("It might be important in some cases for an expert to 
educate the factfinder about general principles, without attempting to apply these 
principles to the specific facts of the case"); Adams, 2000 UT 42, *[fl[ 13-14 (an expert's 
testimony going to a witness's mental capacity is admissible); Wetzel, 868 P.2d at 68. A 
qualified expert was available to consult with counsel in this case and to assist the jury 
with information based on reliable scientific knowledge. See Addendum B. 
King was at a distinct disadvantage since his attorney devised no plan for presenting 
admissible evidence concerning the effects of mental illness and drug abuse on a person's 
ability to accurately perceive, recall, and recount events. 
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Since King's attorney failed to engage in an adequate investigation of the facts, he 
was "'not in a position to make a reasonable strategic choice'" about King's defense. See 
Hales, 2007 UT 14, ^  83 ("the defense could not reasonably have made [a] decision 
[about the expert evidence] without first conducting a full investigation of the merits of 
the case"). King's attorney provided constitutionally deficient assistance. 
B. UTAH LAW ALLOWS DISCOVERY OF MENTAL HEALTH 
DOCUMENTS. 
King's trial attorney failed to obtain mental health records relevant to King's 
defense. See State v. Worthed 2008 UT App 23, ^ 31, 177 P.3d 664 (records are dis-
coverable for in camera review), affd, 2009 UT 79, 222 P.3d 1144. Westphal's mental 
health documents should have been discovered as part of the pretrial investigation. 
(1) A Witness *s Mental Health Documents Are Discoverable If the Defendant Has 
Shown that the Witness's Mental or Emotional Condition Is Relevant to His 
Defense, and the Documents Contain Exculpatory Evidence. 
Although Utah law protects information contained in mental health files from 
discovery, the protection is "not absolute." State v. Cardall 1999 UT 51, \ 29, 982 P.2d 
79; Utah R. Evid. 506(d). Documents are discoverable if they are "relevant to an issue of 
the physical, mental, or emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding in which 
that condition is an element of any claim or defense." Utah R. Evid. 506(d)(1); se<e Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 58-60-114(2)(b), 58-60-509(2)(b), 58-60-510, 58-61-602(2)(b) (2008). 
In State v. Worthed 2009 UT 79, 222 P.3d 1144, the Utah Supreme Court relied 
on existing law to set forth a three-step process for discovering mental health files. 
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Under the first step, a defendant must allege that the "witnesses] mental or emotional 
condition itself is an element of any claim or defense." I<L at \ 19 (relying on Rule 506); 
see also id^ at ^ 35. According to the court, a mental or an emotional "condition" is a 
"state that persists over time and significantly affects a person's perceptions, behavior, or 
decision making in a way that is relevant to the reliability of the person's testimony." IcL 
at If 21 (a witness's mental or emotional health may qualify as a "condition" even if there 
is no formal diagnosis for an illness or disorder). In addition, an "element" of a defense 
is any argument that "interjects doubts into the State's obligation to prove every element 
of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt." IdL at ^ 30 (agreeing with the court of 
appeals' interpretation). Thus, in order for a condition to qualify as an element of a claim 
or a defense, it must persist over time and be a factor in the defense. See_ id^ at fflf 21, 30-
31,35. For example, a condition is relevant to an element of a defense if the defendant 
claims the following: "CI didn't do it,'" and the victim was motivated, influenced, or 
otherwise affected by a persisting mental condition to fabricate or exaggerate allegations 
of criminal conduct. See id. at \ 37. 
Next, under the second step for discovery of mental health files, the defendant 
must show to a "reasonable certainty" that the files exist and they contain exculpatory 
evidence, which would be favorable to the defense. IcL at Tflf 15, 38 (relying on State v. 
Blake, 2002 UT 113, ffi[ 19-20, 63 P.3d 56; Cardall 1999 UT 51, % 30). According to the 
court, this step is "'stringent,'" "'necessarily requiring some type of extrinsic indication 
that the evidence within the [documents] exists and will, in fact, be exculpatory.'" Id. at \ 
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38 (citation and footnote omitted). The defendant may "point to information from 
outside sources suggesting [the witness] . . . has a history of mental illness relevant to 
[her] ability to accurately report on the assault." Blake, 2002 UT 113, \ 21. The second 
step may be satisfied if the person seeking discovery of the files alleges specific facts, 
including, 
references to records of only certain counseling sessions, which are alleged to be 
relevant, independent allegations made by others that a victim has recanted, or 
extrinsic evidence of some disorder that might lead to uncertainty regarding a 
victim's trustworthiness. 
Worthed 2009 UT 79, \ 41 (citing Blake, 2002 UT 113, \ 22; emphasis added). If the 
defendant is able to present"'specific facts justifying the review,5" the facts will support 
the "reasonable certainty test." IcL (citation omitted). 
And finally, the third step for discovery of mental health files is triggered if the 
defendant has satisfied the first two steps. That is, if the defendant has shown, first, that 
the witness's mental or emotional condition is an element of a claim or defense, and 
second, that there is a reasonable certainty that the documents contain exculpatory 
evidence, then under the third step, the trial court must engage in an in camera review of 
the mental health files for materiality. IdL at Yh 14-15; see also State v. Gonzales, 2005 
UT 72, ffi[ 44-45, 125 P.3d 878; Cardall, 1999 UT 51, f 32 ("A defendant has no 
constitutional right to conduct his own search of the State's files"). Mental health files 
are material for purposes of discovery if they contain independently probative 
information relevant to the defense. See, e.g., Worthen, 2009 UT 79, ffif 49, 50. In 
34 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
addition, they are material if they contain information cumulative to the defense: 
cumulative information may be probative and relevant for independent purposes, or it 
may be "of a better quality" than evidence currently available to the defendant and 
therefore material in its own right. Se^e id. at fflf 49, 50. The defendant is not required to 
prove materiality; rather, the trial court must determine materiality in connection with an 
in camera review of the files. See_ id_ at ^ 43, 48. 
In State v. Wort hen, the trial court, the court of appeals, and the supreme court 
each upheld discovery of a witness's mental health files. 2009 UT 79. According to the 
facts, the State placed B.W. in the Worthens' home to live after she had been abused by 
her biological parents. IcL at f 3. The Worthens later adopted B.W., and in July 2005, 
she was argumentative and attempted suicide. IcL The Worthens placed her in an 
inpatient neuropsychiatric program, and she kept a journal describing her anger toward 
her adoptive mother. Id, at ffl[ 3-4. In addition, she alleged that her adoptive father, the 
defendant, sexually abused her. IcL at | 5. As a result of the allegations, the State 
charged the defendant with ten counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child. IcL at *f 1. 
During pretrial discovery, the defendant requested copies of B.W.'s mental health files. 
IcL at f^ 7. The files were discoverable where the victim "harbored extreme hatred 
towards her parents, which created a motive to fabricate allegations of abuse so that she 
would be removed from her parents' home." IcL at ^ 37, 40. In addition, the defendant 
requested specific documents relating to B.W.'s "cognitive problems and propensity for 
misinterpretation." LL at \ 42. Since the request for the files was sufficient, the 
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defendant was entitled to have the trial court review them for materiality. Id. at *H43, 56. 
Likewise, in State v. CardalL 1999 UT 51, the supreme court upheld discovery of 
the victim's mental health records. In that case, the State charged the defendant with rape 
of a child. The defendant requested in camera review of an "anxiety exam" administered 
at the school and documents regarding the victim's allegations of abuse against a school 
janitor. M at \ 10. The defendant claimed the documents related to his defense that the 
victim was "a habitual liar, that she fabricated her story about [the current crime], that she 
[was] mentally and emotionally unstable, and that the records show that on at least one 
previous occasion these psychological traits led her to lie" about a previous similar crime. 
Id_ at \ 29. The supreme court ruled the information could be reviewed. Id. ^ 33, 35. It 
remanded the case for further proceedings. IdL at ^  35; see also Wgrthen, 2009 UT 79, ^ 
23 (stating the "psychological traits" at issue in Cardall - habitual liar, fabricator, and 
mentally and emotionally unstable - satisfied the standard for in camera review, but each 
trait "alone" would not be sufficient to establish an emotional condition). 
On remand, the trial court would assess the documents for materiality, and 
determine whether information contained in the documents "probably would have 
changed the outcome" of the defendant's case. CardalL 1999 UT 51, f^ 35. The above 
principles apply to the discovery of Westphal's mental health files. 
(2) Westphal Has Been Diagnosed with Mental Illnesses and Is an Admitted 
Alcoholic and Drug Abuser: Those Conditions Are Relevant to King's Defense. 
Westphal's mental or emotional condition was an element of a claim or an element 
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of King's defense. As stated above, defense counsel obtained information prior to trial 
concerning Westphal's history with mental illness and drug abuse. See_ supra, Arg. 
A.(l)(a). Westphal had been diagnosed with mental illnesses and drug-induced 
psychoses, and she had relied on those diagnoses to apply for and receive a disability 
payment from Social Security. See Addendum C, ffi[ 2, 4, 5. Westphal's mental illnesses 
and her history with drugs qualified as a mental or emotional condition under Rule 
506(2)(b). See Addendum B, fflf 6-9 (the expert, Dr. Hanson, would have been available 
to advise counsel and the court that methamphetamine-induced psychoses and drug 
addiction are mental illnesses with long-term effects on a person's ability to accurately 
perceive, recall and recount events); see also Worthen, 2009 UT 79, ffif 21, 30-31, 35 (a 
condition qualifies as an element of a claim or a defense if it persists over time and has an 
effect or influence on a factor relevant to the defense). 
In addition, Westphal's mental condition qualified as an element of a claim or a 
defense where the State relied on Westphal's perceptions of events for the prosecution. 
Indeed, the State relied on Westphal's version of events to shape the pretrial 
investigation. SeeR. 1A (Westphal's statements). And it relied on Westphal's testimony 
to implicate King in criminal conduct. See supra, Arg. A.(l)(a). 
Likewise, Westphal's condition constituted an element of a defense where 
evidence supports that King did not assault or kidnap Westphal and Westphal was 
3
 Juarez provided direct evidence to support that King did not assault or kidnap West-
phal. She testified as follows. King did not use drugs on September 25, 2008. R. 
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influenced or impaired in her perceptions by long-term mental health conditions. See 
Addendum C, Iffi 2-3 (defense counsel was aware of Westphal's conditions); Addendum 
B, W 10-14 (a person with Westphal's conditions likely would be impaired in her 
perceptions). The record supports the first step in discovering the mental health files. See 
Utah R. Evid. 506(d)(1); Worthen, 2009 UT 79, ffij 21, 30, 37; see also Addendum C, 
Exhibit 1 at 15 (Westphal thought "Joe" had something to do with the events). 
Next, given the information available to counsel in pretrial proceedings, King's 
attorney should have demonstrated with reasonable certainty that specific information 
from Valley Mental Health: Safe Haven and Salt Lake Valley Store Front existed and 
supported Westphal's heavy drug use and impaired cognitive processes. Specifically, 
defense counsel knew that Safe Haven and Store Front were both substance abuse 
treatment centers and Westphal received treatment for her drug addictions and mental 
151:93, 127. Juarez placed the cord around Westphal's neck because the cord belonged 
to Westphal. R. 151:97-98. Juarez encouraged Westphal to go with them to the 
apartment, and King did not want Westphal there, although she could get her clothes. R. 
151:109, 117, 134, 173; see also R. 152:127. King did not force Westphal into a cab. R. 
151:110-11. King gave Westphal a knife at the apartment to clean her nails and he gave 
her clean clothes to wear because she was filthy. R. 151:111-12, 134, 144-45, 166; see 
also R. 152:115. The three of them talked, drank, and argued about issues at the 
apartment. R. 151:114, 148. No one threatened Westphal with a knife. R. 151:142. 
King made a gesture at Westphal with a cigarette but did not touch or burn her. R. 
151:117. King did not threaten Westphal. R. 151:115-16. Juarez might have told 
Westphal they would take her to the bank in the morning for money but Juarez was 
drank. R. 151:122. King did not tape Westphal, he did not direct Juarez to tape 
Westphal, and he did not threaten Westphal; also, Juarez taped Westphal and she acted 
alone. R. 151:115, 119-20, 121, 153-54, 181-82, 185-86. 
38 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
illnesses at the facilities in 2008. Addendum C, fflf 2-4. In addition, Westphal received a 
diagnosis for methamphetamine-induced psychoses and she made an application to Social 
Security in 2007 or 2008 for a large disability payment due to her mental health issues. 
See id. at ^ 2, 4. In that regard, the record "point[s] to information from outside 
sources" suggesting that Westphal "has a history of [drug use and diagnosed] mental 
illness[es]," which would be "relevant to [her] ability to accurately report on the assault." 
Blake* 2002 UT 113, If 21; see Addendum B, ffif 6-9. King maintains the mental health 
files exist and contain extrinsic evidence of drug use and mental disorders which affect 
Westphal5s credibility as a witness, where her disorders are long term and they 
significantly affect her ability to accurately perceive, remember or recount events. See, 
e.g. Addendum B, Tffl 6-13. 
Under the circumstances, defense counsel should have presented sufficient 
information to satisfy the second step in discovering the mental health files. See 
Worthen, 2009 UT 79, If 41 (under the "reasonable certainty" test, "'extrinsic evidence of 
some disorder that might lead to uncertainty regarding'" a witness's credibility will 
support discovery of mental health documents) (citation omitted). The information 
would have triggered the third step: in camera review of the files for materiality. IdL at Yi 
15, 43 (citations omitted). In this case, the trial court did not reach the third step because 
defense counsel was deficient in requesting discovery of the files. 
(3) Defense Counsel Made a Deficient Request for the Mental Health Records. 
King's attorney made an inadequate request for the mental health files in pretrial 
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discovery. Specifically, the record shows that on March 11, 2009, defense counsel 
requested that the trial court compel Valley Mental Health to produce documents relatmg 
to Westphal for in camera review. R. 30-31. On March 18, 2009, defense counsel 
amended the request and asked for documents from "the Storefront and Safe Haven 
programs." R. 33-34.4 Counsel did not indicate that the documents were discoverable 
under an exception to the privilege at Rule 506, set? R. 30-31, 33-34; in addition, counsel 
did not indicate that the documents would contain exculpatory evidence "of some 
disorder that might lead to uncertainty regarding" Westphal's credibility. Blake, 2002 
UT 113422. 
On April 24, 2009, the trial court advised defense counsel that his request for 
mental health files was inadequate under Utah law. R. 148:4. The court asked defense 
counsel to "brief the issues and it set a briefing schedule. R. 148:6-7. Thereafter, 
defense counsel withdrew his requests for the documents because he believed he could 
not "meet the admissibility requirements regarding the alleged victims medical and bank 
records" for purposes of discovery under the law. R. 67. 
Where the mental health files should have been discoverable under the law, and 
the information was relevant to the defense, supra, Arg. B.(2), defense counsel's failure 
to make an adequate request for the records constitutes deficient performance. Gordon, 
4
 On March 30, 2009, defense counsel requested documents relating to Westphal's 
treatment for "[c]ourt-ordered probation," documents from a podiatrist, and documents 
from Wells Fargo Bank. R. 50-51. Defense counsel stated the documents related to 
Westphal's drug use, mental state, and credibility. R. 51. 
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913 P.2d at 356 ("'a decision not to investigate cannot be considered a tactical 
decision'") (citation omitted). The mental health documents should have been pursued as 
part of defense counsel's investigation to "set[] the foundation for counsel's strategic 
decisions about how to build the best defense." Hales, 2007 UT 14, \ 69. They would 
have assisted in establishing Westphal's mental condition, and the influences on her 
perceptions and her cognitive processes and functions. See Addendum B, % 18; Worthen, 
2009 UT 79, TJ 21 (a mental or emotional condition persists over time and affects "a 
person's perceptions, behavior, or decision making in a way that is relevant to the 
reliability of the person's testimony"). Since defense counsel was ineffective in 
discovering the mental health files, this Court may remand this case so that the trial court 
may supplement the record on appeal with mental health files in order that King may 
have an adequate record of the issues for appeal. 
C. COUNSEL'S DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE RESULTED IN PREJUDICE. 
The first step of the Strickland test is satisfied: King's attorney provided ineffec-
tive assistance when he failed to investigate facts relevant to the defense. Templin, 805 
P.2d at 188; see also Addendum C, f^ 10; supra Args. A.(l) and B. A proper investiga-
tion would have allowed King's attorney to make informed and professional choices 
about the case. It would have allowed counsel to make "strategic decisions about how to 
build the best defense." Hales* 2007 UT 14, \ 69. For example, if King's attorney had 
engaged in a proper investigation, he would have discovered evidence to present through 
an expert, who was available to discuss how mental illness and drug abuse affect a 
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person's ability to accurately perceive reality, and to recall and recount events. See 
supra, Arg. A.(2). Since King's attorney failed to investigate, he failed to make 
reasonable decisions about presenting King's defense. See Crestani, 111 P.2d at 1090 
(counsel can make informed choices after engaging in a reasonable investigation). 
The second step of the test assesses whether '"there is a reasonable probability 
that, absent the errors, the [jury] would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.'" 
Hales, 2007 UT 14, f 86 (footnote omitted). Under the second step, the court balances 
the gravity of the legal error against the State's evidence. The Utah Supreme Court 
stated, "Because '[s]ome errors will have had a pervasive effect on the inferences to be 
drawn from the evidence, altering the entire evidentiary picture, and some will have had 
an isolated trivial effect,' in determining the effect of the error, we 'consider the totality 
of the evidence before the . . . jury.'" Hales, 2007 UT 14, \ 86 (footnote omitted). 
To that end, Utah courts have ruled that error is prejudicial in cases where 
evidence is in conflict or susceptible to different interpretations. In Hales, the pivotal 
issue at trial concerned an expert's interpretation of CT scans. "Based on the CT scans 
and other medical evidence regarding retinal hemorrhaging," the State's expert, Dr. 
Walker, concluded that the victim was shaken and suffered a non-accidental injury 
resulting ultimately in death. LL at J^ 77. In addition, the State's expert was the only 
witness to anchor his opinions regarding the cause and the timing of the victim's injuries 
to the defendant for the conviction. LL at U 89. Since the State's evidence going to the 
CT scans was pivotal, the court ruled that the defendant's attorneys provided ineffective 
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assistance when they failed to challenge the evidence with their own expert; indeed, a 
defense expert was available and would have given the jury a competing interpretation of 
the CT scans for the jury's assessment. I(L at \ 91. In addition, the "competing 
interpretation would have likely cast doubt" on the State's theory focused on the 
defendant. LL Thus, under the circumstances, the failure to investigate the issues and to 
retain an expert was prejudicial. IcL at \ 92 (where the State's case hinged on the expert's 
interpretation, and an alternative interpretation existed to raise a reasonable doubt, the 
prejudice standard is met). 
In Templin, the defendant was charged with rape. 805 P.2d at 183. After 
conviction, he filed a motion and then appealed, arguing that counsel failed to investigate 
witnesses who would testify that the defendant and victim were affectionate prior to the 
alleged rape. M at 185. The Utah Supreme Court considered the uninvestigated 
testimony to be relevant in assessing whether the victim later consented to sex: "The 
testimony of these witnesses, though not completely consistent with [defendant's] 
testimony, contradicted several aspects of [the victim's] testimony" regarding 
nonconsensual sexual activity. IcL at 185. The evidence would have reflected on the 
"credibility of the only witness who gave direct evidence of defendant's guilt"; it would 
have affected the "'.entire evidentiary picture.'" M at 188 (footnote omitted). Con-
sequently, defense counsel's failure to investigate resulted in prejudice. IcL at 188-89. 
In this case, if counsel had engaged in a proper investigation for King's defense, 
there is a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome since the information that defense 
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counsel failed to explore was pivotal to the prosecution and the defense. Specifically, a 
proper investigation into Westphal's mental and emotional condition would raise 
significant questions about her ability to accurately perceive and respond to events. At 
trial, Westphal acknowledged mental illness diagnoses and a diagnosis for psychoses. 
See R. 152:5, 6. She used methamphetamine for years, R. 152:52, 54-56, and described 
herself as a drug addict and alcoholic. R. 152:53, 56-57, 88. For a period of time before 
September 25, 2008, Westphal spent an unspecified amount of money on an unknown 
quantity of crack cocaine. R. 152:49, 52, 58-60, 77. In addition, on September 25, she 
withdrew money from the bank and spent it or gave it away, R. 152:62; and she smoked 
crack cocaine and shared vodka with others. R. 152:14-15, 38, 77. Westphal testified 
she currently uses drugs if she slips up. R. 152:56-57. And she smoked crack cocaine 
within a month or two of trial. R. 152:57, 107; see also Addendum B, ffl[ 10-13. 
Westphal demonstrated and revealed facts supporting impaired cognitive processes and 
functions. See_ supra, Arg. A.(2) and B; see also Addendum B. 
Nevertheless, the State relied on Westphal's perceptions to implicate King in 
crime. According to Westphal, on September 25, King directed Juarez to place a cord 
around her throat as the initial aggressive act at Pioneer Park, R. 152:16; he provoked a 
woman named Alaska to assault her at the park, R. 152:18; he hit her, threatened her with 
a knife, and threatened her life, R. 152:22, 25, 26, 28, 32, 33; he directed her to get into a 
cab at knife point, R. 152:71, 72, 81; he threatened to take her to the bank in the morning 
to withdraw money from her account, R. 152:28-29, 34; he directed Juarez to put tape on 
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Westphal's wrists and ankles at the apartment, R. 152:30-32; and he forced alcohol down 
Westphal's throat. IcL Notably, the State presented no physical evidence linking King to 
crime: the investigating officers failed to confiscate the cord that was placed around 
Westphal's neck, R. 152:142-43; they failed to confirm that King used a knife they 
retrieved from the apartment, see, e.g., R. 152:66 (Westphal was unable to identify the 
knife); they were unable to obtain useable fingerprint evidence, R. 152:121; and 
Westphal had no visible bruises or marks as a result of the alleged events. See 
Addendum C, Ex. 1 at 43-44. 
Where the State relied on Westphal's testimony to implicate King in crime, it also 
presented conflicting evidence. Specifically, Juarez testified that King did not assault 
Westphal, see R. 151:116, 161; he did not threaten her, R. 151: 110-11, 115-16, 142; he 
did not bind her with tape; and he did not direct Juarez to bind Westphal. See R. 151: 
115, 119-20, 121, 153-54, 181-82, 185-86: see also supra, footnote 3 herein. But see R. 
152:132-34 (Detective Gordon testified that she bluffed Juarez and used deceptive tactics 
to obtain statements). Rather, Juarez put the tape on Westphal. R. 151:119-22. 
Given the conflicts in the evidence and the centrality of Westphal's perceptions, it 
should have been evident to defense counsel that an investigation into Westphal's mental 
condition was necessary. Yet King's attorney did not investigate the issues or develop a 
strategy for presenting relevant information to the jury. Instead he relied on Westphal's 
cross-examination. See Addendum C, f^ 10. Yet Westphal was not qualified to address 
how her mental illnesses and drug use affected her perceptions. See. R. 152:54. In 
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addition, her cross-examination did not shed light on how mental illness and drugs use 
influenced her ability to accurately perceive, recall, and recount events. See Addendum 
B, *h 16 (Westphal was likely unaware of her own impaired processes); see also Hales, 
2007 UT 14, ^  90 (defense counsel called a forensic pathologist and attempted to under-
mine the State's evidence by asking questions about the CT scans on cross-examination). 
The decision not to investigate was unreasonable and unprofessional. In addition, 
an attorney providing reasonable professional assistance would have presented the 
defense, since evidence that Westphal was impaired in her perceptions would have 
altered the entire evidentiary picture. If counsel had investigated and presented the 
defense, see supra, Arg. A. and B., the information would have raised doubts about the 
State's case. See_ Hales, 2007 UT 14, \ 91 (evidence of a competing theory would cast 
doubt on the State's case). Additionally, "it is relevant that [Dr. Hanson's] affidavit 
further indicates that other crucial portions" of Westphal's testimony was susceptible to 
attack by a qualified expert. Id:, see_ Addendum B, ^  15-17. 
Because the State's case hinged on Westphal's perceptions and interpretations, the 
jury likely would have been swayed by a proper investigation and a defense shedding 
light on how Westphal's perceptions were impaired. Sew Addendum B. There is a 
reasonable probability that the proper investigation and defense would have "raise[d] a 
reasonable doubt as to [defendant's] guilt." Hales, 2007 UT 14, | 92. 
CONCLUSION 
King is able to satisfy both parts of Strickland with the supplemental facts set forth 
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in the Affidavits of Glen R. Hanson, Ph.D., D.D.S., and Manny Garcia. Salt Lake Legal 
Defender Association has interviewed each witness, and ascertained their availability and 
testimony as set forth in the attached affidavits pursuant to Johnston, 2000 UT App 290. 
Inasmuch as the affidavits support the determination that trial counsel provided 
ineffective assistance, they are pivotal to King's claims on appeal. On that basis, and for 
the additional reasons set forth herein, King respectfully requests that this Court remand 
this case to the trial court for supplementation of the record on appeal with the mental 
health files and evidence from Dr. Hanson. 
DATED THIS J g t day of July, 2010. / ! 
LIND^A M. JONES "' T 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASS'N 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, LINDA M. JONES, hereby certify that I have caused a copy of the foregoing to 
be hand delivered to the Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 
East 300 South, 6th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this V5 day of July, 2010. 
DELIVERED this i^ day of July, 2010. 
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